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Petitioner-Appellant

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO
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Honorable Robert C Naftz

Dtstrict Judge

Appealed from the District Court of the ....;S;.;.;ixt.;.;.h~-
Judtcial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
_ _ _...;;B...;;a_nn_o:...;c;.;.;
·k_ _ _ County.

Molly Huskey
State Appellate Public Defender
Attorney _

- -- - - -

_

.:.;
X_ _

X

For Appellant

Lawrence G. Wasden
Idaho Attorney General

Attorney _ _.:.;X_ _ For Respondent _X_

Filed this

_ __

day of

~~~~~~~-~~~--

Clerk
Deputy

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

WOODROW JOHN GRANT,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,

Supreme Court No. 39207-2011

CLERK'S RECORD

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock.
Before HONORABLE Judge Robert C. Naftz District Judge.

For Appellant:
Molly Huskey
State Appellate Public Defender
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0005

For Respondent:
Lawrence G. Wasden

Idaho Attorney General
Post Office Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
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User: DCANO

Case: CV-2011-0000759-PC Current Judge: Robert C Naftz
Woodrow John Grant, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Woodrow John Grant, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

2/13/2011

LOCT

NO ELlA

SURPEME COURT APPEAL; diane

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Petition for Post Conviction Relief w/ Affidavit w I
support: pro se

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Motion and Affidavit in support for appointment of Robert C Naftz
counsel ; pro se

CAMILLE

Motion and Affidavit for permission to proceed on Robert C Naftz
partial payment of ocurt fees (prisoner) pro se

NO ELlA

New Case Filed-Post Conviction Relief

Robert C Naftz

3/4/2011

CAMILLE

Order extending time for filing an Answer; s/
Judge Naftz 2-25-2011

Robert C Naftz

3/17/2011

CAMILLE

Notice of intent to dismiss;
3-17-2011

Robert C Naftz

4/4/2011

CAMILLE

Petitioners Response to Courts Notice of Intent to Robert C Naftz
dismiss; pro se

CAMILLE

Motion to Amend Petition for Post Conviction
Relief: pro se

Robert C Naftz

5/5/2011

CAMILLE

Motion for leave to Amend Petition for Post
Conviction Relief;
pro se

Robert C Naftz

5/11/2011

CAMILLE

Order Dismissing Petition for Post conviction
Robert C Naftz
relief; court hereby Dismisses the Petition for Post
Conviction Relief: s/ Judge Naftz 5-10-2011

DSBT

CAMILLE

Dismissed Before Trial Or Hearing

Robert C Naftz

CSTS

CAMILLE

Case Status Changed: Closed

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Order Denying Motion for leave to Amend Petition Robert C Naftz
for Post Conviction Relief; (Court DENIES the
Moiton for leave to Amend Petition for Post
Conviction Relief) s/ Judge Naftz 5-12-2011

5/27/2011

CAMILLE

Motion to alter or amend or reconsider order
Robert C Naftz
dismissing petition for post conviction relief; pro
se

8/11/2011

CAMILLE

Order Denying motion to alter or Amend or
reconsider Petition for Post Conviction Relief;
(Petitioners Motion is hereby DENIED) s/ Judge
Naftz 8-9-2011

Robert C Naftz

APSC

DCANO

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Robert C Naftz

NOTC

DCANO

NOTICE OF APPEAL; Woodrow Grant, pro se

Robert C Naftz

MOTN

DCANO

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR
APPONTMENT OF COUNSEL

Robert C Naftz

MOTN

DCANO

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION
TO PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF
COURT FEES(Prisoner)

Robert C Naftz

MISC

DCANO

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL: Signed
and Mailed to SC and Counsel on 9-22-11.

Robert C Naftz

2/14/2011

2/23/2011

5/13/2011

9/21/2011

9/22/2011

NCPC

Judge

s/ Judge Naftz

s
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Time: 02:46 PM

User: DCANO
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Case: CV-2011-0000759-PC Current Judge: Robert C Naftz
Woodrow John Grant, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Woodrow John Grant, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

9/29/2011

ORDR

DCANO

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
Robert C Naftz
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL; Signed by Judge
Naftz on 9-26-11 filed on 9-29-11. (Mailed copies
to Counsel and SC on 10-19-11)

9/30/2011

MISC

DCA NO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Clerk's Record Due
Date Suspended. Reason for Suspension:
Suspended for DC Order of Fee Waiver and/or
Appointment of Counsel.

10/13/2011

MISC

DCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Clerk's Certificate
Robert C Naftz
received in SC on 10-7-11. Carefully examine the
Title and Cert. advise Dist. Court Clerk if any
errors or corrections. The Title in the Cert. must
appear on all documents filed in SC.

MISC

DCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Clerk's Record Due
Date Suspended. Reason for Suspension:
Suspended for Dist. Court Order on Fee Waiver
and pr Appointment of Cousnel.

10/30/2011

MISC

DCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Documents received Robert C Naftz
in SC on 10-21-11 Order Appointing State
Appellate Public Defender.

11/8/2011

MISC

DCANO

IDAHO SURPEME COURT; Notice of Appeal
received in SC on 9-23-11. Docket Number
39207-2011. Clerk's Record to be filed in SC on
12-28-11. ( 11-23-11 5 weeks prior).

Robert C Naftz

1/18/2012

MISC

DCANO

CLERK'S RECORD RECEIVED IN COURT
RECORDS ON 1-18-12.

Robert C Naftz

MISC

DCANO

Provided a copy of Clerk's Record on Bannock
County Prosecuting Attorney's Office Jeanne
Hobson on 1-18-12.

Robert C Naftz

MISC

DCANO

CLERK'S RECORD mailed to Counsel on
1-18-12. Due in Supreme Court on 2-16-12.
(Mailed and faxed notice to Klondy on 1-18-12.

Robert C Naftz

Judge

Robert C Naftz

Robert C Naftz
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Petitioner

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

)
)

Petitioner,
vs.

Respondent.

D<\t-.>" :>oc: x

Case No. - - - - -

)
)
)
)
)

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPORT FOR
APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL

)
)

entitled matter and moves this Honorable Court to grant Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of
Counsel for the reasons more fully set forth herein and in the Affidavit in Support of Motion for
Appointment of Counsel.
1.

Petitioner is currently incarcerated within the Idaho Department of Corrections

under the direct care, custody and control of

2.

The issues to be presented in this case may become to complex for the Petitioner

to properly pursue. Petitioner Jacks the knowledge and skill needed to represent him/herself.
3.

Petitioner/Respondent required assistance completing these pleadings, as he/she
was unable to do it him/herself.

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL- 1
Revised: I0/13/05

9

4.
DATED this _3_ day of

F<-bruc;..r'7

X

'20Jl_.

LJon,)rot ..
Petitioner

1

G-ra...,J.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

STATE OF IDAHO
County

and says as follows:
I.

I am the Affiant in the above-entitled case;

2.

I am currently residing at the -.L!...L£::cU..:W""--~~~_:,_~~~c:::::_~.J.;:d-ll...~-'
under the care, custody and control of Warden

V'JF· £'--y::::,! u:

,:_

3.

I am indigent and do not have any funds to hire private counsel;

4.

I am without bank accounts, stocks, bonds, real estate or any other form of real

property;
5.

I am unable to provide any other form of security;

6.

I am untrained in the law;

7.

If I am forced to proceed without counsel being appointed I will be unfairly

handicapped in competing with trained and competent counsel of the State;
Further your affiant sayeth naught.
MOTION AND AFFIDAVll IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF C01JN"SEL- 2
Rc·;ised: IOJ! 3/05

Hl

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully prays that this Honorable Court issue
Order granting Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Counsel to represent his/her interest,
or in the alternative grant any such relief to which it may appear the Petitioner is entitled to.
DATED

This~ day of_,£'----""e-..:Jb""'r'-'v=c..=r--:;'1'--------' 20_1_(.
X

LJ Oo cJrot..J G--ra . . . }-

Petitioner

''TV

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN AND AFFIRMED to before me this
of

F~1r u&i'y

1_ day

,20_1L.

(SEAL)

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR ~~.PPOI.!'-JTrv1ENT OF COlJl'-JSEL ~ 3
Revised: I 0/13/05
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

B.~fcJJ-Joc

r.;

Case No.: _ _ _ _ __
L'T

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR
PERMISSION TO PROCEED ON PARTIAL
PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER)

Plaintiff,
vs.

Defendant.

IMPORTANT NOTICE: Idaho Code § 31-3220A requires that you serve upon counsel for
the county sheriff, the department of correction or the private correctional facility,
whichever may apply, a copy of this motion and affidavit and any other documents filed
in connection with this request. You must file proof of such service with the court when
you file this document.
STATE OF IDAHO

)

A

)ss.

County of _._\:.o.0"-";_;><._ _ _ _ _ )

[N Plaintiff

] Defendant asks to start or defend this case on partial payment of court

fees, and swears under oath
1. This is an action for (type of case) ---'-~""-'---'-...Jo..;'-'"-'-"--'"'-'....W..."-'-'-''--..l-.l..!~~-'---
believe I'm entitled to get what I am as king for.

iviOTIOi~ Ai~-o

AFF-iDA\liT FOR

PERiviiSSi·Ot~

TO

PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES
(PRISONER)
CAO 1-10C 2/25/2005
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'

/

2/G1 I have not previously brought this claim

against the same party or a claim based on

the same operative facts in any state or federal court. [

] I have filed this claim against the

same party or a claim based on the same aper ative facts in a state or federal court.
3. I am unable to pay all the court costs now.

I have attached to this affidavit a cur rent

statement of my inmate account, certified by a custodian of inmate accounts, that reflects the
activity of the account over my period of incarceration or for the last twelve ( 12) months,
whichever is less.
4. I understand I will be required to pay an initial partial filing fee in the amount of 20% of the
greater of: (a) the average monthly deposits to my inmate account or (b) the average monthly
balance in my inmate account for the last six (6) months. I also understand that I must pay the
remainder of the filing fee by making monthly payments of 20% of the preceding month's
income in my inmate account until the fee is paid in full.
5. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true. I understand that a false
statement in this affidavit is perjury and I could be sent to prison for an additional fourteen ( 14)
years.
Do not leave any items blank. If any item does not apply, write "N/A". Attach additional pages
if more space is needed for any response.
IDENTIFICATION AND RESIDENCE:

How Iong at that address?_--"=---'---'-------- Phone:---'-~---"---1-=-r:....;___
Date and place of
DEPENDENTS:
I am f':xt:single [

] married. If married, you must provide the following information:

Nameofspouse: ___________________________________________________

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMiSSiON TO
PROCEED ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES
(PRISONER)
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My other dependents (including min or children) are: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

INCOME:
Amount of my income: x.$_ _0,. ,. ~-" ·,/_·_

per [

] week

yl month

Other than my inmate account I have outside money from: __,Jc.,;;;;_~~----------

ASSETS:
List all real property (land and buildings) owned or being purchased by you.

Your
Address

City

State

Legal
Description

Value

Equity

List all other property owned by you and state its value.

Description (provide description for each item)

Value

Notes and Receivables

Bank/Credit Union/Savings/Checking Accounts
Stocks/Bonds/Investments/Certificates of Deposit

Retirement Accounts/IRAs/401 (k)s
Cash Value Insurance
Motorcy cles/Boats/RV s/S nowmob il es:
Furniture/Appliances

'

\\ \\..')!)('

Jewelry/Antiques/Coli ectibles
~v10TION A~JD
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Description (provide description for each item)

Value

Tools/Equipment
Sporting Goods/Guns
Horses/Livestock/Tack
Other (describe)

EXPENSES: List all of your monthly expenses.
Average
Monthly Payment

Expense
Rent/House Payment

' \ \h
l\.Jt"'

Vehicle Payment(s)
Credit Cards: (list each account number)

Loans: (name of lender and reason for loan)

()f

Electricity/Natural Gas
Water/Sewer IT rash

vs··

Auto Maintenance
Cosmetics/Haircuts/Salons
Entertainment/Books/Magazines
Home Insurance
rv10TfON
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Average
Monthly Payment

Expense

Auto Insurance
Life Insurance
Medical Insurance
Medical Expense

6

Other

MISCELLANEOUS:

How much can you borrow? $_ _ _ _
/6_-·____ From w h o m ? - - - - - - - - - When did you file your last income tax return? _ _ _ _ Amount of refund: $_ _ _ _ __
PERSONAL REFERENCES: (These persons must be able to verify information provided)

\D
''

Phone

YeaJS Known
'!,'"":;, /~/\ ,".~

'
Typed or Printed Name
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

j"~ day of

20JL.
otary Publi_c_:fo=r=l=d~ah=o===::;;:+=-;:==Residing
at
,
My Com miss ion expires --'11-;f-/i_t-ow...r/_./'-'3,___

I
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IDOC TRUST

===========

OFFENDER BANK BALANCES

==========

Doc No: 80692
Name: GRANT, WOODROW JOHN
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE

02/09/2011

=

ICC/UNIT H PRES FACIL
TIER-1 CELL-S

Transaction Dates: 02/09/2010-02/09/2011
Beginning
Balance
0.00

Total
Total
Current
Charges
Payments
Balance
978.32
982.03
3.71
================================ TRANSACTIONS ================================
Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance
08/03/2010
08/03/2010
08/05/2010
08/09/2010
08/09/2010
08/16/2010
08/16/2010
08/16/2010
08/23/2010
08/24/2010
08/25/2010
08/30/2010
08/30/2010
08/31/2010
09/03/2010
09/23/2010
09/28/2010
09/30/2010
10/01/2010
10/05/2010
10/06/2010
10/08/2010
10/12/2010
10/13/2010
10/19/2010
10/20/2010
10/29/2010
11/02/2010
11/03/2010
11/04/2010
11/09/2010
11/15/2010
11/16/2010
11/16/2010
11/29/2010
11/30/2010
12/07/2010
12/10/2010
12/14/2010

HQ0509116-001
HQ0509126-012
HQOS09592-010
II0510207-936
II0510207-937
II0510956-754
II0510956-755
II0511009-014
II0511745-724
HQ0511936-017
II0512197-025
II0512627-710
II0512627-711
II0512849-010
IC0513396-338
HQOS15727-018
IC0516314-557
HQ0516504-018
IC0516678-013
IC0516897-517
IC0517382-020
HQ0517870-008
IC0517927-561
IC0518343-029
IC0518919-688
HQ0519092-009
HQOS20042-014
IC0520360-526
IC0520671-012
HQ0520724-017
IC0521439-557
HQ0522095-016
IC0522179-646
IC0522304-006
HQ0523469-014
IC0523588-011
IC0524936-488
HQ0525483-003
IC0525877-493

950-REINCARCERATED
013-RCPT RDU
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
071-MED CO-PAY
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
100-CR INM CMM
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
071-MED CO-PAY
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
078-MET MAIL
099-COMM SPL
078-MET MAIL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
078-MET MAIL
099-COMM SPL
022-PHONE TIME
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
078-MET MAIL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
078-MET MAIL
011-RCPT MO/CC
070-PHOTO COPY
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
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IBSUSPCHK
RDU
RTCP MO

383325
RTCP MO

397008
289942
171930
114549
116152
056586
115978
116547
879315
117188
521575
076807
117143
731067
117142
741214

0.00
1. 03
50.00
14.97DB
12.13DB
10.20DB
5.59DB
S.OODB
1.86DB
40.00
1.86
19.27DB
6.80DB
7.00DB
lO.OODB
340.00
85.75DB
100.00
0.17DB
78.22DB
1. 73DB
50.00
22.30DB
1.73DB
280.23DB
17.00DB
25.01
21. 48DB
2.75DB
20.00
21. 79DB
20.00
17.88DB
2.71DB
50.00
2.80DB
36.59DB
40.00
36.59DB

0.00
1. 03
51.03
36.06
23.93
13.73
8.14
3.14
1.28
41.28
43.14
23.87
17.07
10.07
0.07
340.07
254.32
354.32
354.15
275.93
274.20
324.20
301.90
300.17
19.94
2.94
27.95
6.47
3.72
23.72
1. 93
21.93
4.05
1. 34
51.34
48.54
11.95
51.95
15.36

IDOC TRUST

===========

OFFENDER BANK BALANCES

==========

Doc No: 80692
Name: GRANT, WOODROW JOHN
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE

02/09/2011

=

ICC/UNIT H PRES FACIL
TIER-1 CELL-S

Transaction Dates: 02/09/2010-02/09/2011
Beginning
Balance
0.00

Total
Total
Current
Charges
Payments
Balance
978.32
982.03
3.71
================================ TRANSACTIONS ================================
Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance
12/14/2010
12/14/2010
12/14/2010
12/17/2010
12/20/2010
12/21/2010
12/23/2010
12/28/2010
01/04/2011
01/07/2011
01/10/2011
01/11/2011
01/18/2011
01/18/2011
01/24/2011
01/25/2011
01/27/2011
01/31/2011
02/01/2011
02/03/2011
02/08/2011
02/08/2011

IC0525914-493
IC0525926-670
IC0525974-022
HQ0526491-008
IC0526734-012
HQ0526858-009
IC0527219-495
HQ0527590-011
IC0528324-630
IC0529034-029
HQ0529142-011
IC0529332-582
IC0529982-599
IC0529984-027
IC0530741-027
IC0530816-582
HQ0531291-016
IC0531529-029
IC0531587-567
HQ0532078-014
IC0532636-528
HQ0532829-012

099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
078-MET MAIL
011-RCPT MO/CC
078-MET MAIL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
078-MET MAIL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
100-CR INM CMM
078-MET MAIL
099-COMM SPL
061-CK INMATE
078-MET MAIL
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
022-PHONE TIME

122490
845087
121218
843423
182745
127823
640902

132982
K-133158
132091
317879
131224

-36.59DB
44.21DB
4.85DB
20.00
6.16DB
50.00
48.07DB
50.00
54.13DB
1.05DB
30.00
6.00DB
26.48DB
54.13
2.75DB
42.29DB
9.25DB
2.07DB
7.00DB
40.00
31.26DB
6.80DB

is a full, true, and

51.95
7.74
2.89
22.89
16.73
66.73
18.66
68.66
14.53
13.48
43.48
37.48
11.00
65.13
62.38
20.09
10.84
8.77
1. 77
41.77
10.51
3.71

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

WOODROW GRANT,
Petitioner,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
}
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-11-759-PC

ORDER EXTENDING TIME
FOR FILING AN ANSWER

Respondent.
_________________________________
)

Based on Respondent State of Idaho's motion filed herein and good cause
appearing, therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the Respondent is granted an extension of time
for filing an Answer in this matter. Said Answer shall be filed by
DATED

this~~

/a.S /II

'3

day of February, 2011 ,.

~c.~
ROBERT C. NAFTZ
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
true and correct copy of the ORDER TO EXTEND TIME FOR FILING AN ANSWER
upon each of the following individuals in the manner indicat1

£1 mail -

WOODROW GRANT #80692
ICC- W
P 0 BOX 70010
BOISE ID 83707

postage prepaid
[] hand delivery
[]facsimile

JARED W. JOHNSON
DEPUTY PROSECUTOR
BANNOCK COUNTY COURTHOUSE
POCATELLO ID 83201

[ ] mailp6stage prepaid
hand delivery
[ ] facsimile

[1

DALE HATCH, Clerk of the Court
By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Deputy Clerk

20

MARK L. HIEDEMAN
BANNOCK COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
P.O. Box P
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-0050
(208) 236-7280

JARED W. JOHNSON, ISB #7812
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
WOODROW GRANT,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-11-759-PC

MOTION TO EXTEND TIME
FOR FILING AN ANSWER

Respondent.
____________________________
)
COMES NOW, the Respondent State of Idaho by and through JARED W.
JOHNSON, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby moves this court for a 30 day
extension of time for filing an Answer in this matter.
This motion is based on the Respondent not having received the necessary
Affidavit from Petitioner's former Defense Attorney.
DATED this~ day of February, 2011,

J

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this

Z Y day of February, 2011, a true and

correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR FILING AN ANSWER
was delivered to the following:
WOODROW GRANT #80692

ICC-W
P 0 BOX 70010
BOISE 10 83707

r

Hmailpostage prepaid
[ ] hand delivery
[ ] facsimile

.. '

' f' ...

· &J
. '

.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TlfE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

WOODROW GRANT,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

Case No. CV-2011-759-PC

NOTICE OF INTENT
TO DISMISS

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case comes before this Court on a pro-se Petition for Post Conviction Relief, a
Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Counsel, and a Motion and Affidavit for
Permission to Proceed on Partial Payment of Court Fees filed by Woodrow Grant ("the
Petitioner" or "Mr. Grant"). The State did not respond.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Grant pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine
and domestic assault and was subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The Petitioner
previously filed a Rule 35 Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence, as well as an appeal
of the denial of that motion. (See Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief w/ Aff. in Supp. ("Pet. for
Post-Conviction Relief'), Feb. 14, 2011, 2.)
This Court is fully briefed in the Petitioner's allegations and the law. Furthermore, this
Court has carefully reviewed the Petition for Post Conviction Relief and the accompanying
motions and affidavits. Based upon the following discussion, this Court hereby gives the
Petitioner notice of its intent to dismiss the Petition for Post Conviction Relief.
Notice of Intent to Dismiss
Re: Petition for Post Conviction Relief
Case No. CV-2011-759-PC
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ISSUES

1.

Whether to grant the Motion for Appointment of Counsel.

2.

Whether to grant the Motion for Partial Payment of Court Fees.

3.

Whether to grant the Petition for Post Conviction Relief.
DISCUSSION

In support of his Petition for Post Conviction Relief, Mr. Grant first argues he received
the ineffective assistance of counsel. The Petitioner also alleges relief is warranted on the basis
that "[t]here is evidence and material facts not previously presented or heard." (Id.) Mr. Grant
further argues post conviction relief is appropriate because his "[g]uilty plea was not
knowingly/voluntarily entered as Petitioner is mentally incompetent due to being bi-polar." (/d.)
Finally, the Petitioner alleges the "[s]entence imposed is cruel and unusual as it is excessive in
respect to the facts of the case. This violates both the U.S. Constitutional & [sic] Idaho
Constitution [sic] Rights of the Plaintiff." (/d.) However, with the exception of some additional
arguments in support of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Petitioner failed to
support the other allegations with argument or evidence. Mr. Grant did not point this Court to
the underlying record or any transcripts of proceedings.

1.

Whether to grant the Motion for Appointment of Counsel.
a.

Standard of Review

Notice of Intent to Dismiss
Re: Petition for Post Conviction Relief
Case No. CV-2011-759-PC

2

A request for appointment of counsel in a post conviction proceeding is governed by
Idaho Code ("IC") § 19-4904 1, which provides that a court-appointed attorney may be made
available to an applicant who is unable to pay the costs of representation. Charboneau v. State,
140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). The decision to grant or deny a request for
court-appointed counsel lies within the discretion of the district court. ld. (citing Fox v. State,
129 Idaho 881, 934 P .2d 94 7 (Idaho Ct.App. 1997)). When a district court is presented with a
request for appointed counsel, the court will address that request before ruling on the substantive
issues in the case. ld.
Under IC § 19-4904, the court "should determine if the petitioner is able to afford counsel
and whether this is a situation in which counsel should be appointed to assist the petitioner." Jd.
at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. In making this analysis, the court considers the typical problems with
pro se pleadings, such as the fact that these types of pleadings are often conclusory and
incomplete and that facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged because the pro se
petitioner does not know what they may be. ld. (citing Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 23 P.3d
138 (2001)). However, the court must examine the record to determine "whether the facts are
such that they justify the appointment of counsel." ld. at 794, 102 P.3d at 1113. In doing so,
every inference must run in the petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented and

1

§ 19-4904. Inability to pay costs.
If the applicant is unable to pay court costs and expenses of representation, including stenographic, printing, witness
fees and expenses, and legal services, these costs and expenses, and a court-appointed attorney may be made
available to the applicant in the preparation of the application, in the trial court, and on appeal, and paid, on order of
the district court, by the county in which the application is filed.

Notice of Intent to Dismiss
Re: Petition for Post Conviction Relief
Case No. CV-2011-759-PC
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cannot be expected to know how to allege the necessary facts. ld. At a minimum, the court
"must carefully consider the request for counsel, before reaching a decision on the substantive
merits of the petition." ld.
If, after examining a petitioner's claims, the court determines that such claims are
frivolous, "it is essential that the petitioner be given adequate notice of the claimed defects so he
has an opportunity to respond." Id. at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. If the petitioner alleges facts that
raise the possibility of a valid claim, the court should appoint counsel in order to give the
petitioner an opportunity, working with counsel, to properly allege the necessary supporting
facts. ld; see also, Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 493, 95 P.3d 642, 644 (Idaho Ct.App. 2004)
(Although the petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to search the record for
possible nonfrivolous claims, he should be provided with a meaningful opportunity to
supplement the record and to renew his request for court-appointed counsel prior to the dismissal
of his petition where he has alleged facts supporting some elements of a valid claim.). The court
"should provide sufficient information regarding the basis for its ruling to enable the petitioner to
supplement the request with the necessary additional facts, if they exist." !d.
"[A] district court presented with a request for appointed counsel in a post-conviction
action must address that request before ruling on the substantive issues in the case and errs if it
denies a petition on the merits before ruling on the applicant's request for counsel." Judd v.
State, 148 Idaho 22, 218 P.3d 1, 2 (Idaho Ct.App. 2009). However,

an order that simultaneously dismisses a post-conviction action and denies a motion for
appointment of counsel will be upheld on appeal if the petitioner received notice of the
fatal deficiencies of the petition and if, when the standard governing a motion for
Notice of Intent to Dismiss
Re: Petition for Post Conviction Relief
Case No. CV-2011-759-PC
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appointment of counsel is correctly applied, the request for counsel would properly be
denied - that is, when the petitioner did not allege facts raising even the possibility of a
valid claim.

!d. at 4. A determination regarding a request for the appointment of counsel and a determination
regarding whether a petition for post conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal are thus
governed by "quite different standards, with the threshold showing that is necessary in order to
gain appointment of counsel being considerably lower than that which is necessary to avoid
summary dismissal of a petition." !d.

b.

Analysis

This Court must examine the petition to determine whether the facts alleged justifY the
appointment of counsel. If such facts appear to this Court to be frivolous, or the situation
presented does not appear to be one in which counsel should be appointed to assist the Petitioner,
this Court may deny the request for counsel.
Based on the following findings, this Court hereby DENIES the Petitioner's Motion for
Appointment of Counsel, as the allegations made by the Petitioner are frivolous for the reasons
stated herein. Furthermore, this Court finds the Petitioner did not allege facts raising even the
possibility of a valid claim. Therefore, the appointment of counsel is not required.

2.

Whether to grant the Motion for Partial Payment of Court Fees.
This Court must also determine whether the Petitioner's Motion to Proceed on Partial

Payment of Court Fees should be granted. Along with that motion, the Petitioner submitted an

Notice of Intent to Dismiss
Re: Petition for Post Conviction Relief
Case No. CV-2011-759-PC
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affidavit certifying he is unable to pay all the court costs now. Idaho Appellate Rule ("IAR") 23 2
governs the waiver of appellate filing fees. According to subsections one (1) and ten (10) of that
rule, there is no filing fee required for petitions for post conviction relief. Even so, after having
carefully reviewed Mr. Grant's request and the accompanying affidavit, this Court concludes the
Petitioner is unable to afford whatever costs might be required for proceeding with his Petition
for Post Conviction Relief. Therefore, the fee waiver request is GRANTED.

3.

Whether to grant the Petition for Post Conviction Relief.
a.

Standard of Review

A petition for post conviction relief is governed by the Uniform Post Conviction
Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), IC §§ 19-4901- 19-4911. Such a petition initiates a proceeding that
is civil in nature. State v. Gilpin-Grubb, 138 Idaho 76, 79, 57 P.3d 787, 790 (2002); State v.

LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 806, 69 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Idaho Ct.App. 2003). Under IC § 19-4901(a),
a person who is convicted of or sentenced for a crime may institute a proceeding to secure relief
based on a claim that the conviction was in violation of the state or federal constitutions or the
laws of Idaho, or that "there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and

2

Rule 23. Filing fees and clerk's certificate of appeal--Waiver of appellate filing fee
(a) Filing Fees. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall charge the following filing fees for appeals and petitions:
(1)
Appeals in civil cases except for habeas corpus and post-conviction relief
$ 86.00
(1 0)
Petitions for post-conviction relief
$None

No appellate filing fee is required for agencies of the State ofldaho and Counties of the State ofidaho, including
public defenders, pursuant to l.C. § 67-2301 and l.C. § 31-3212(2).

Notice of Intent to Dismiss
Re: Petition for Post Conviction Relief
Case No. CV -20 11-759-PC
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heard, that requires the vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interests of justice," among
other grounds.
Pursuant to IC § 19-4901 (b), a petition for post conviction relief is not a substitute for
appeaL A petitioner is not allowed to raise any issue that could have been raised on a direct
appeal, but was not so raised, unless those issues were not known and could not have reasonably
been known at the time of the appeal. Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 603, 21 P.3d 924,
925 (2001). Similarly, a post conviction petitioner may notre-litigate the same issues that were
already presented in a direct appeal. Gilpin-Grubb, 138 Idaho at 81, 57 P.3d at 792.
IC § 19-4902(a)3 establishes the time limits for the filing of a petition for post conviction
relief, requiring that "[a]n application may be filed at any time within one (1) year from the
expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the
determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." That section of the code
also requires that "[f]acts within the personal knowledge of the applicant and the authenticity of
all documents and exhibits included in or attached to the application must be sworn to
affirmatively as true and correct."

3

19-4902. Commencement of proceedings--Verification--Filing--Service--DNA testing
(a) A proceeding is commenced by filing an application verified by the applicant with the clerk of the district court
in which the conviction took place. An application may be filed at any time within one (I) year from the expiration
of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an
appeal, whichever is later. Facts within the personal knowledge ofthe applicant and the authenticity of all
documents and exhibits included in or attached to the application must be sworn to affmnatively as true and correct.
The supreme court may prescribe the form of the application and verification. The clerk shall docket the application
upon its receipt and promptly bring it to the attention of the court and deliver a copy to the prosecuting attorney.
Notice of Intent to Dismiss
Re: Petition for Post Conviction Relief
Case No. CV-2011-759-PC
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IC § 19-4903 4 further demands that a petitioner state and identify in the application for
post conviction relief the grounds upon which the application is based, the specific relief
requested, all previous proceedings in the case and the facts that are within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner. That section also requires that a petitioner attach affidavits, records
and other evidence supporting the allegations, or recite why such evidence is not attached to the
application. IC § 19-4903 has been interpreted to require that an application "must present or be
accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application shall be
subject to dismissal," i.e., the application must contain more facts than the "short and plain
statement of the claim" that is required ofthe usual civil complaint by Rule 8(a)(l) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure ("IRCP"). Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,271-72,61 P.2d 626,62829 (Idaho Ct.App. 2003).
IC § 19-4906(b) permits a court to dismiss the action if the court is satisfied, based on the
record, that the petitioner is not entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by any further
proceedings. That section also requires that the court, as a prerequisite to dismissal, give the
petitioner notice of intent to dismiss and provide twenty days during which the petitioner may

4

§ 19-4903. Application--Contents

The application shall identifY the proceedings in which the applicant was convicted, give the date of the entry of the
judgment and sentence complained of, specifically set forth the grounds upon which the application is based, and
clearly state the relief desired. Facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant shall be set forth separately from
other allegations offacts and shall be verified as provided in section 19-4902. Affidavits, records, or other evidence
supporting its allegations shall be attached to the application or the application shall recite why they are not attached.
The application shall identifY all previous proceedings, together with the grounds therein asserted, taken by the
applicant to secure relief from his conviction or sentence. Argument, citations, and discussion of authorities are
unnecessary.
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respond. However, under IC § 19-4906(c)5 the court may summarily dispose ofthe petition
upon the motion of either of the parties when, based on the record, there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No notice of intent
to dismiss is required for a summary disposition under that section. Saykhamchone v. State, 127
Idaho 319,321-22,900 P.2d 795,797-98 (1995). Summary dismissal under either section is the
procedural equivalent of a motion for summary judgment. Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 741
P.2d 374 (Ct. App. 1987); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 873 P.2d 898 (Ct.App. 1994). Thus,
in determining whether to summarily dismiss, a court must view the facts in a light most
favorable to the petitioner and determine whether those facts would entitle the petitioner to relief
if accepted as true. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 798, 25 P.3d 110, 111 (2001); Goodwin, 138
Idaho at 272, 61 P.2d at 629; LePage, 138 Idaho at 806, 69 P.3d at 1067. If the court finds that
the accepted facts entitle the petitioner to relief, the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing.

LePage, 138 Idaho at 806-07, 69 P.3d at 1067-68.
Summary dismissal of an application may be appropriate, even if the State does not
controvert the petitioner's facts, because "the court is not required to accept either the applicant's
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions
oflaw." Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.2d at 629; LePage, 138 Idaho at 807, 69 P.3d at 1068.
Further, a petition is "subject to summary dismissal if the petitioner has not presented evidence
5

IC § 19-4906(c). The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the application when it
appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together
with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter oflaw.
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establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the applicant bears
the burden of proof." Raudebaugh, 135 Idaho at 604, 21 P.2d at 926.
Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no
genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the
applicant to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary
hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163
(Ct.App.l991); Hoover v. State. 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458,459 (Ct.App.1988);
Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89, 741 P.2d 374, 376 (Ct.App.1987). Summary
dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief may be appropriate, however, even
where the state does not controvert the applicant's evidence because the court is not
required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by
admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho
644, 647, 873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct.App.l994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715
P.2d 369,372 (Ct.App.l986).
Franck-Teel v. State, 143 Idaho 664, 667-68, 152 P.3d 25, 28-29 (Idaho Ct.App. 2007). The

court in that case further explained the procedure for summary dismissal when the state has not
provided notice of the grounds for dismissal.
[I]f the state's motion fails to give notice of the grounds, the court may grant summary
dismissal only if the court first gives the applicant twenty days' notice of intent to dismiss
and the grounds therefore, pursuant to Section 19-4906(b). Flores v. State, 128 Idaho
476, 478, 915 P.2d 38, 40 (Ct.App.l996). This procedure is necessary so that the
applicant is afforded an opportunity to respond and to establish a material issue of fact.
!d.
!d. at 668, 152 P.3d at 29. "On appeal from a summary disposition, [the Court of Appeals]

exercises free review. Yon v. State, 124 Idaho 821, 822, 864 P.2d 659,660 (Ct.App.1993);
Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct.App.1988)." Abbott v. State, 129

Idaho 381,382,924 P.2d 1225, 1228 (Idaho Ct.App. 1996).

10
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DISCUSSION

As explained previously, the bulk of Mr. Grant's Petition for Post Conviction Relief
concerns the alleged failure of his counsel to adequately represent him. The Petitioner set forth
12 grounds in support of that claim. However, Mr. Grant failed to elaborate on or offer support
in the form of argument or additional evidence as to the other grounds raised in support of post
conviction relief. Therefore, this Court will only address in detail the Petitioner's contentions
regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court will review those claims in tum.

a.

Standard of Review Governing a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

"In order to establish a violation of the constitutional guarantee to effective assistance of
counsel, the defendant must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice." Beasley

v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 359, 883 P.2d 714, 717 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994) (internal citations
omitted). The test for evaluating whether a criminal defendant has received the effective
assistance of counsel is two-pronged and requires that the petitioner establish: ( 1) counsel's
conduct was deficient because it fell outside the wide range of professional norms; and (2) the
petitioner was prejudiced as a result of the deficient conduct. Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 584,
6 P .3d 831, 834 (2000); Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 101, 982 P .2d 931, 936 ( 1999) (citing

Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687, 104 S.Ct. 2052,2064 (1984)). "Facts presented
must be in the form of competent, admissible evidence. Bare assertions and speculation,
unsupported by specific facts, do not suffice to show ineffectiveness of counsel." Roman v.

State, 125 Idaho 644, 649, 873 P.2d 898,903 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994)(intemal citations omitted).
In assessing the reasonableness of attorney performance, counsel is presumed to have
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rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment. Pratt, 134 Idaho at 584, 6 P.3d at 834; State v. Matthews, 133 Idaho 300,
306-07, 986 P.2d 323, 329-30 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Strategic and tactical
decisions will not be second guessed or serve as a basis for post conviction relief under a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective review.
Pratt, 134 Idaho at 584, 6 P.3d at 834; Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368

(1994), cert denied 513 U.S. 1130 (1995). To satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test,
the applicant must establish that there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's
unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Milburn v.
State, 135 Idaho 701, 706, 23 P.3d 775, 780 (Idaho Ct.App. 2000)(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at

694); Fox v. State, 125 Idaho 672,674, 873 P.2d 926,928 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994). The applicant
must show that the attorney's deficient conduct 'so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.' Milburn,
135 Idaho at 706,23 P.3d at 780 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). The applicant must show
actual unreasonable performance by trial counsel and actual prejudice. /d. "Hence, dismissal is
proper if the applicant fails to meet his burden under either part." Fox, 125 Idaho at 674, 873
P.2d at 928; Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903 ("To avoid summary dismissal, a postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must sufficiently allege facts under both
prongs of the test.").

b.

Analysis
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1.

Change ofvenue

The Petitioner first argues his counsel was ineffective because he "refused to attempt a
change of venue even when counsel was informed that the victim's mother was a secretary of the
local police chief." (Pet. for Post-Conviction Reliefw/ Aff. in Supp. ("Pet. for Post-Conviction
Relief'), Feb. 14, 2011, 2.) In further support of that argument, the Petitioner stated the
following in his affidavit: "The victim has a history of self-abuse and has threatened to blame
me for injuries that were self-inflicted. The victim's behavioral problems and brushes with the
law have been covered up and concealed by her mother who is the secretary for the local chief of
police." (Aff. in Supp., Feb. 14,2011, 5:5-6.)
"The reasons for a change of venue, as set forth in Idaho Criminal Rule 2l(a) and 2l(b)6,
are that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the case is pending or that the
convenience of the parties and the witnesses would best be served by a change of the venue."

State v. Fee, 124 Idaho 170, 175, 857 P.2d 649, 654 (Idaho Ct.App. 1993). "[T]he issue of
whether a change of venue should be requested is a matter of trial strategy and tactical choice,
not subject to review as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the absence of proof of
inadequate preparation or ignorance on counsel's part. State v. Carter, 103 Idaho 917, 923, 655
P.2d 434,440 (1982)." ld.

6

Rule 21. Change of venue
(a) For Prejudice. The court upon motion of either party shall transfer the proceeding to another county if the court
is satisfied that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the case is pending.
(b) Other Cases. For the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice, the court upon motion
of the defendant may transfer the proceedings as to the defendant to another county.
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In this case, there is nothing in the record to establish the basis for a change of venue,
even if such a request had been made. As such, the failure of the Petitioner's counsel to move for
a change of venue did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel since that decision was
clearly a matter of trial strategy and tactical choice.

2.

Counsel refused to request a "change of Judges"

The Petitioner next argues his counsel was ineffective because he "refused to request a
change of judges and did not request Judge Naftz recuse [sic] himself when counsel was
informed that Judge Naftz had been an attorney representing the Petitioner's brother at an earlier
date and due to the circumstances surrounding that previous case might be biased." (Pet. for
Post-Conviction Relief at 2-3.) In his "Affidavit in Support", Mr. Grant further states: "I feel
that the sentencing judge was unduly biased against me as he had represented my brother as his
attorney at an earlier date." (Aff. in Supp. at 6:8.) However, the Petitioner offered no support
for those bare allegations and does not allege any specific points of error that might reveal the
district court's bias. "Furthermore, the decision whether to request the recusal of a trial judge is
a strategic matter, one which should be left to the discretion of the attorney. See Giles v. State,
125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994)." Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 333, 971 P.2d
1151, 1157 (Idaho Ct.App. 1999). As such, the failure of the Petitioner's counsel to request the
recusal of the trial judge did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

3.

Counsel did not pursue the option of Mental Health Court

Mr. Grant next argues: "Counsel was fully aware of Petitioner's mental health issues and
did not actively pursue the option of the Mental Health Court." (Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief
Notice oflntent to Dismiss
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at 3.) The Petitioner does not offer any admissible evidence in support of this contention. Mr.
Grant re-stated this allegation in his Affidavit, however, he attached no documentation to verify
this claim, nor did he submit records or other evidence. (See Aff. in Supp. at 6:12.) Therefore,
as this is only a bare and conclusory allegation, unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence, Mr.
Grant has not proven this allegation by a preponderance of the evidence as required by the
statutes governing post conviction proceedings. This "court is not required to accept either the
applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's
conclusions oflaw." Downingv. State, 132 Idaho 861,861,979 P.2d 1219, 1219 (Idaho Ct.App.
1999) (internal citations omitted). As the application did not present adequate evidence
supporting this allegation, Mr. Grant has not shown his counsel was ineffective because he failed
to "actively pursue the option of the Mental Health Court."

4.

Counsel was ineffective for failing to protect the Petitioner's interests
during the "psych-evaluation"

Mr. Grant next claims his counsel was ineffective because he
failed to advise, attend, or protect client's interests during the psych-evaluation. Nor did
he advise the Petitioner that the Petitioner was not obligated to provide information that
would be used against him. This is ineffective assistance of counsel under the Estrada
case and thus violates the Petitioner's U.S. Constitutional and Idaho Constitutional
Rights.
(Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 3.) In his Affidavit in Support, the Petitioner merely
reiterated these same allegations. (See Aff. in Supp. at 6:13-15.)
Mr. Grant appears to argue his counsel failed to advise him of his rights regarding some
type of psychological evaluation. However, beyond his use of the term "psych-evaluation", Mr.
15
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Grant does not explain what type of evaluation was conducted. He references the case of

Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006), which pertains to the rights afforded to
defendants in relation to psychosexual evaluations. As the Petitioner did not request the review
of the underlying criminal record, this Court cannot examine any evaluations or even determine
what type of"psych-evaluation", if any, occurred here. If the report at issue is a psychosexual
evaluation, certain Fifth Amendment rights would attach, as concluded by the Idaho Supreme
Court in Estrada. However, without any information regarding the type of report at issue, this
Court is unable to evaluate this claim further. Moreover, Mr. Grant has presented no admissible
evidence to show how his alleged participation in any evaluation implicates his counsel in this
case. As such, this is another unsubstantiated claim, which can provide no relief under the
Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act.

5.

Failure of counsel to submit mitigating evidence

Mr. Grant further argues his counsel was ineffective because he "failed to provide the
sentencing court with mitigating evidence and evidence conflicting the victim's allegations
despite such evidence being available." (Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 3.) Mr. Grant offered
nothing more than that statement. In his Affidavit in Support, he merely stated: "There was
mitigating evidence which my attorney failed to bring up which I feel would have been
beneficial." (Aff. in Supp. at 6:16.) There was nothing submitted to this Court that identified
any mitigating evidence that might have changed the outcome of these proceedings. See State v.

Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 97, 967 P.2d 702, 711 (1998)(Because the petitioner failed to submit
anything to the court that "identifie[d] any mitigating evidence that might have changed the
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outcome of these proceedings", the petitioner failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel.).
Therefore, as these contentions amount to bare and conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by
any admissible evidence, Mr. Grant has failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel as to this
claim.

6.

Failure of counsel to offer evidence disputing the victim's allegations
and failure to show the victim's mother acted inappropriately

The Petitioner next argues post conviction relief is warranted because: "Counsel failed to
show that victim's mother used her position as secretary to the local Chief of Police to
manipulate the system in such a way as to paint the victim as an innocent [with] no criminal
tendencies." (Pet. for Post-conviction Relief at 3.) Again, Mr. Grant offers nothing more than
this statement and a nearly identical statement included in his supporting affidavit. (See Aff. in
Supp. at 6:17.) He does not point this Court to any evidence to verify these allegations, or even
detail how the victim's mother "used her position to manipulate the system ...." As such, Mr.
Grant has not proven this allegation by a preponderance of the evidence as required by the
statutes governing post conviction proceedings, as explained previously. Therefore, Mr. Grant
has not shown his counsel was ineffective because he allegedly failed to provide information
regarding the victim's claims or because he failed to demonstrate that the victim's mother acted
inappropriately.

7.

Counsel did not explain the Petitioner's appeal rights

Mr. Grant's next argument states in full:
Counsel did not adequately explain the appeal process to the Petitioner and did not realize
that, due to his mental health issues, the Petitioner was unable to make an informed
Notice of Intent to Dismiss
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decision as to whether to pursue his appeal options. This caused the Petitioner to lose his
chance at appealing the sentence and possibly receiving a lesser sentence.
(Pet. for Post-conviction Relief at 3.) In his supporting affidavit, Mr. Grant also stated:
"Counsel did not explain the appeal process adequately nor did he take into account the deep
depression which causes apathy and feelings of hopelessness. Because of this I lost my appeal
rights and by time [sic] my mental state stablized [sic] it was too late to pursue them." (Aff. in
Supp. at 6:18-19.)
Again, Mr. Grant has failed to adequately support this claim. The Petitioner has not
produced facts sufficient to state a claim that entitles him to relief. Even assuming counsel failed
to adequately advise the Petitioner as to the appeal process and that this amounted to the
deficient performance of counsel required under the first part of the Strickland test, Mr. Grant
has nonetheless failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from such conduct, which is
required by the second part of that test. In the absence of a showing of prejudice, the Petitioner's
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard must also fail. See Martinez v. State, 125
Idaho 844, 847, 875 P.2d 941,944 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994).

8.

Counsel failed to protect the Petitioner's interests during the PreSentence Investigation

Mr. Grant also argues post conviction relief is warranted on the basis that "[c]ounsel
failed to advise, attend, or protect client's interests during the Pre-Sentence Investigation
(P.S.I.)." (Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 3.) Mr. Grant goes on to state:
The interview was conducted by a biased party and the information garnered was used
adversely against the Petitioner. At no time did counsel inform Petitioner that he was not
18
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obligated to provide information to be used against him and said rights were gauranteed
[sic] by the US and Idaho Constitution.
(ld. at 3-4.) In his affidavit, the Petitioner further stated: "Counsel did not explain the P.S.I.

process to me nor did he attend the interview or provide counsel during the interview.
Information obtained during this process was used against me." (Aff. in Supp. at 6:20.)
The Idaho Court of Appeals has determined that counsel cannot provide ineffective
assistance by failing to advise a client concerning his presentence investigation since a
presentence interview is "not a critical stage of the adversarial proceedings .... " Stuart v. State,
145 Idaho 467,471, 180 P.3d 506,510 (Idaho Ct.App. 2008). '"[I]fthe stage is not critical,
there can be no constitutional violation, no matter how deficient counsel's performance.' United
States v. Ben/ian, 63 F.3d 824,827 (9th Cir.l995); see Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562, 149 P.3d at

837." Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448,452,224 P.3d 515, 519 (Idaho Ct.App. 2010.)
Furthermore, the defendant bears the burden of objecting to a PSI at the time of sentencing.
Cunningham v. State, 117 Idaho 428, 788 P .2d 243 (Idaho Ct.App. 1990).

Thus, in light of the above holdings, the Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance in
relation to the presentence investigation must fail. The Petitioner further failed to offer any
admissible evidence in support of this contention. Therefore, as this is only a bare and
conclusory allegation, unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence, Mr. Grant has not proven this
allegation by a preponderance of the evidence as required by the statutes governing post
conviction proceedings.
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9.

Counsel should have recognized and accounted for the Petitioner's
mental health issues

Mr. Grant argues his counsel was ineffective in failing to recognize the Petitioner's
mental health issues and addictive behaviors. Mr. Grant stated: "Since counsel was aware of the
Petitioner's mental health issues and addictive behaviors, the attorney should have been
cognizant of the Petitioner's bi-polar mood swings and recognized depression driven behaviors
such as giving up and not appealing the sentence and conviction." (Pet. for Post-Conviction
Relief at 4.) In his Affidavit in Support, Mr. Grant made additional arguments:
During the proceedings I was going through bi-polar mood swings aggravated by
the fact that I was refusing meds from the jail so that I could try to concentrate on my
case and what was occuring [sic].
Since counsel was representing someone with mental health issues and since bipolarism [sic] is a well documented illness, counsel should have been cognizant of my
special needs. He was not.
(Aff. in Supp. at 6:4, 21.)
Although it is not completely clear, it appears to this Court that Mr. Grant is alleging his
counsel was ineffective for failing to recognize that the Petitioner was not mentally competent at
the time he entered his plea. See IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 18-210 (2010)("No person who as a result
of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist
in his own defense shall be tried, convicted, sentenced or punished for the commission of an
offense so long as such incapacity endures.") "The standard to determine competency to stand
trial is whether the defendant has 'the capacity to understand the proceedings against him and (2)
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assist in his defense."' Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671,678,227 P.3d 925, 932(2010)(quoting

Dusky v. US., 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)).
In order to find that petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective for refusing to request a ...
hearing on petitioner's competency to stand trial, petitioner must show that counsel was
deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the outcome of petitioner's proceedings. In
[Jeter. 417 S.E.2d at 596], this Court proclaimed that in proving Strickland prejudice
within the context of counsel's failure to fully investigate the petitioner's mental
capacity, "the [petitioner] need only show a 'reasonable probability' that he was ...
incompetent at the time of the plea."

!d. Thus, in a post conviction relief action, the petitioner has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was incompetent when he entered his guilty plea.
Jd.(intemal citations omitted).
In this case, Mr. Grant has not provided admissible evidence showing that there is a
reasonable probability that he was incompetent at the time he entered his plea. Mr. Grant offered
nothing more than his own allegations that he was suffering from "bi-polar mood swings" and
affected by "depression driven behaviors, such as giving up and not appealing the sentence and
conviction." (Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 4.) The Petitioner's own conclusory and bare
assertions alone are not sufficient to survive summary dismissal. Mr. Grant's affidavit offers
nothing more than a mere conclusion that he was not competent to understand the nature of the
proceedings and knowingly enter into a guilty plea, and is also unsupported by any facts as to his
alleged mental incompetency. Without something in the record suggesting that an examination
would have shown that Mr. Grant was incompetent, there is nothing to satisfY the prejudice
prong of Strickland, and this claim must also fail.

21
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10.

Counsel made false assurances regarding the plea agreement and
possible sentence

The Petitioner next argues his "attorney made false assurances of what the plea bargin
[sic] would accomplish and what kind of sentence the Plaintiff could expect. The attorney also
related these assurances to the Petitioner's family." (Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 4.) In his
affidavit, Mr. Grant states that his attorney led him to believe he would be placed in the "rider"
program. (Aff. in Supp., Feb. 9, 2011, 5:3.) He further alleged: "Counsel told both me and my
parents that a rider was the likely result of my accepting a plea bargin [sic]." (/d. at 7:22.)
Finally, Mr. Grant stated: "Counsel did not give me a realistic appreciation of what I could
reasonably expect during sentencing." (/d. at 7:24.)
The Idaho Court of Appeals has given the following pertinent explanation regarding
counsel's role in the plea process:
Where, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea
upon the advice of counsel, ''the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's
advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."
Griffith v. State. 121 Idaho 371, 373, 825 P.2d 94, 96 (Ct.App.1992). See also Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); State v. Soto. 121
Idaho 53, 55, 822 P.2d 572, 574 (Ct.App.1991). When it is asserted that a guilty plea was
the product of ineffective assistance, to prove the prejudice prong the defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he or she would
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill. 474 U.S. at 59,
106 S.Ct. 366; Dunlap v. State. 141 Idaho 50, 59, 106 P.3d 376,385 (2004).

Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 884, 187 P.3d 1253, 1259 (Idaho Ct.App. 2008.)
Mr. Grant does not explain the alleged "false assurances" made by his counsel.
Furthermore, he does not point to the record or offer any other evidence regarding this
contention. As such, the Petitioner has utterly failed to prove the prejudice prong, as he has not
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shown or even argued "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he ...
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. As such, his claim
of ineffective assistance in this regard cannot stand.

11.

The Petitioner's efforts to fire his court-appointed attorney failed

Mr. Grant next alleges he "attempted to rid himself of the court-appointed public
defender and get someone else assigned who had the Petitioner's best interests in mind." (Pet.
for Post-Conviction Relief at 4.) Mr. Grant further stated the following in his affidavit: "I
attempted to change counsel but was not allowed to." (Aff. in Supp. at 7:23.)
Through these allegations, the Petitioner makes absolutely no claim that his counsel was
deficient or that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiency. Mr. Grant further offered no
documentation regarding his attempts to fire his court-appointed attorney. Therefore, as this
contention is not even oriented toward a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and is
unsupported by the required evidence, it cannot stand.

12.

Counsel failed to call certain witnesses

The Petitioner argues his counsel was inadequate by failing to "bring up the testimony of
the witnesses who supported the Petitioner's side nor did counsel have the private investigators
findings brought up during the sentencing phase." (Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 4.) Mr.
Grant offered nothing more in support of this allegation.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has set forth the following succinct explanation regarding the
decision to call witnesses:
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It is well settled that the decision whether to call a particular witness is a strategic or
tactical decision which will not be second-guessed or serve as a basis for post-conviction
relief under an alleged claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless that decision is
shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 775
P.2d 1243 (Ct.App.l989); see also State v. !vfcKenney, 101 Idaho 149, 609 P.2d 1140
(1980), citing State v. Tucker. 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 556 (1975).

Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254,258, 869 P.2d 571, 575 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994).
The petition submitted by Mr. Grant does not provide any basis for an objective
evaluation regarding his counsel's decision whether to call witnesses. Once again, the Petitioner
has submitted a conclusory statement and presented no facts to give rise to a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether his counsel's performance fell outside the wide range of professional
norms. Furthermore, the decision whether to call a particular witness is a strategic or tactical
decision. Therefore, his claim of ineffective assistance in this regard also fails.

13.

The Petitioner did not adequately support his claims of ineffective
assistance

Notwithstanding the preceding discussion, Mr. Grant failed to show how his counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687,
I 04 S.Ct. 2052. First, Mr. Grant failed to demonstrate that his counsel's performance fell outside
the wide range of professional norms, as he offered nothing more than conclusory statements.
Mr. Grant did not support his allegations of ineffective assistance with documentation or make
any argument regarding how he was prejudiced by any alleged deficient conduct. Secondly,
even accepting the Petitioner's claim that his counsel was inadequate, the Petitioner still failed to
demonstrate prejudice, as he offered no specific facts and made no argument that the outcome of
Notice of Intent to Dismiss
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his case would have been different but for his attorney's unprofessional errors. Therefore, Mr.
Grant's allegation that his counsel was ineffective is no more than a conclusory allegation.
"Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not suffice to show
ineffectiveness of counsel." Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903. As such, the Petitioner's
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are without merit, and his Petition for Post Conviction
Relief cannot be granted on that basis.

c.

The Petitioner failed to support any of his claims with sufficient evidence

The applicant in a post conviction proceeding must prove the allegations upon which the
request for relief is based by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, an application for post
conviction relief must include evidence supporting its allegation, or the application must state
why such supporting evidence is not included. This "court is not required to accept either the
applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's
conclusions oflaw." Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861, 861,979 P.2d 1219, 1219 (Idaho Ct.App.
1999) (internal citations omitted).
Mr. Grant has only offered bare and conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by any
admissible evidence. For example, this Court determined Mr. Grant did not satisfy his burden of
proof regarding his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Likewise, as he offered nothing
more than short, conclusory statements regarding his additional grounds for post conviction
relief, he has not proven those allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, either. An
application for post conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal
knowledge of the applicant and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations
Notice of Intent to Dismiss
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must be attached or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with
the application. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4903 (20 10). The application in this case did not
present adequate evidence supporting any of the Petitioner's allegations. Therefore, as Mr. Grant
has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the Petitioner's favor, would
entitle him to the requested relief, summary dismissal of the Petition for Post Conviction Relief
is warranted. As such, in accordance with Idaho Code § 19-4906, and having given the
Petitioner adequate notice of the claimed defects contained in his Petition for Post Conviction
Relief, this Court hereby indicates its intention to summarily dismiss Mr. Grant's petition.
CONCLUSION

This Court DENIES the Petitioner's request for the appointment of counsel because this
Court finds the Petitioner's claims are without merit. The Court hereby GRANTS the Petitioner's
Motion for Fee Waiver.
Based on the foregoing and in accordance with Idaho Code § 19-4906, this Court hereby
indicates its intention to dismiss the Petitioner's request for post conviction relief. The Petitioner
must submit a suitable reply, appropriately addressing his arguments in support of post
conviction relief, as well as satisfactorily indicating the reasons he is entitled to such relief,
within twenty (20) days from the date of the entry of this Notice of Intent to Dismiss. If, after
submitting additional information, the Petitioner alleges facts sufficient to raise the possibility of
a valid claim, rather than bare, conclusory allegations, this Court will again consider whether the
claims merit an evidentiary hearing. However, if the Petitioner fails to reply within the allotted
time frame, this matter will be dismissed without further action of this Court.
Notice of Intent to Dismiss
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

tl_ day ofMarch, 2011.

~s~.~
DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:
Mark L. Hiedeman
Woodrow Grant, IDOC No. 80692
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WOODROW J. GRANT
80692, ISCI / 15A-20B
P.O. Box 14
Boise, ID 83707

,_

i
tJ
J.o

Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT

COU~T

OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
oOo
WOODROW J. GRANT,

)

)
Petitioner,

Case No. CV 2011-759-PC

)

)
-vs-

)

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)

Respondent.
____________________________
)
COMES NOW, WOODROW J. GRANT, Petitioner prose, in the above-captioned cause,
who pursuant to Rule 15, of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks leave to
amend the current Petition for Post-Conviction

~elief

that is presently before this

District Court for its consideration based upon the foregoing reasons.
HISTORY OF ACTION
Petitioner filed before this Court a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief with a Affidavit In Support via "Mail Box Rule" on February 9, 2011. This
Court upon receiving said petition conducted an initial review of the Petition and
pursuant to I.C. 19-4906(b) issued a Sua Sponte Notice of Intent to Dismiss the
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
Petitioner then on March 31, 2011, via "Mail Box Rule" submitted a Motion to
Amend Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, one page, and Petitioner's Response to
Courts Notice of Intent to Dismiss.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Case No. CV-2011-7~

-1-

61

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
Idaho Code 19-4906 of the Uniform Post-Conviction Relief Act authorizes the
District Court to permit Amendment of the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
See: Parsons v. State, 113 Idaho 421, 426, 745 P.2d 305 (Ct.App. 1987), and is
appropriate in doing so when the District Court has issued a Notice of Intent to
Dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief.
GROUND TO AMEND
Petitioner is not trained in the science of law and is only able to file the
pending matter with the assistance of another inmate who has experience in these
matters that are presently before the District Court and prison policy permits such
legal assistance from other inmates.
Petitioner filed the pending matters before the District Court while housed
at the Idaho Correctional Center (ICC) and then was transferred just after the
receipt of the District Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss and then submitted on
March 31, 2011, the Motion to Amend Petition for Post-conviction Relief and
Petitioner's Response to Court's Notice of Intent To Dismiss.
Petitioner seeks leave to amend the petition that is presently before the
District Court so as to cure any and all defects in the current petition and attempt
to overcome this Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss with a First Amended Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief and First Affidavit of Facts in Support of First Amended
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief along with other pleadings to further the
petitioner in defeating this Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss.
Petitioner seeks FORTY-FIVE (45) days from the date of this Court's Order to
Submit the First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief along with any other
supporting pleadings that petition may want this court to consider if this Motion
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this Motion for Leave to Amend Petition for PostConviction Relief petitioner requests that that this Court grant him leave to amend
and for any other relief that may be permitted by law.
Respectfully submitted this APRIL.~S , 2011.

Woodrow J. Grant, Petitioner
VE~IFICATION

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of ADA

)

ss.
WOODROW J. GRANT, being sworn under oath deposes and says:
I am the petitioner in the above-entitled matter, and that all statements are
true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Woodrow J. Grant, Petitioner
SUBSCRIBED, SWORN and

AFFI~MED

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
0:lse No. CV-2011-759-R.:;

to before me this APRIL

-3-

63

2011.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on APRIL~8

, 2011, I mailed a copy of this MOTION FOR

LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF for the purposes of filing with
the court and of mailing a true and correct copy via prison mail system for
processing to the U.S. mail system to:
BANNOCK COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID 83201

Woodrow J. Grant, Petitioner

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Case No. CV-2011-7.59-R::
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WOODROW GRANT
80692, ISCI Unit-13
Post' Office Box 14
Boise, Idaho 83707
Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUUDIDIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
oOo
WOODROW GRANT,

)
)
)

Petitioner,

)

)
)
)
)
)

-vsSTATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CV-2011-759-PC
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND OR
RECONSIDER ORDER DISMISSING
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF

Respondent.
_______________________________
)
COMES NOW,

Woodrow Grant,

Petitioner pro se,

in the above-captioned

matter, who in accordance with Rule 59(e), 60(b), and ll(a){2)(B), I.R.C.P.,
brings forth this Motion to Alter or Amend or Reconsider the district court's
May ll, 2011, Order Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, for the
reasons set forth more fully below.
LEGAL STANDARD

Petitioner's motion to alter or amend the judgment is brought pursuant
to Rules 59(e), 60{b) and ll(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 59(e) provides that "[a] motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be
served not later than fourteen (14) days after entry of the judgment." In this
case,

the Court's Order dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was

filed May 11, 2011, and the petitioner received it via

u.s.

Mail at the ISCI

Facility where petitioner is housed on May 13, 2011. This motion is therefore
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND OR RECONSIDER
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per the "MAIL BOX RULE" for petitioner delivered it to prison officials for
~~~
the purposes of mailing to the Court Clerk on MAY ;(If , 2011. See: Hayes v.
State, 143 Idaho 88, 91, 137 P.3d 475, 478 (Ct. App.2006).
A review of appellate case law suggests that Rule 59( e), 60(b), and
ll(a)(2)(B), have all been used to challenge a district court's dismissal of a
petition for post-conviction relief. See: Lee v. State, 122 Idaho 196, 832
P.2d ll31
pursuant

(1992)
to

(appellant filed a motion to alter or amend the

I.R.C.P.

59( e)

following

the

Court's

Order

judgment

denying

the

petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief.); Eby v. State, 148 Idaho
731, 228 P.3d 998, 1004 (2010) (holding that relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6)
may be appropriate for dismissal of post-conviction relief action pursuant to
I .R.C.P. 60(b) (6) upon a showing of "unique and compelling circumstances");
Freeman v. State, 122 Idaho 627, 628, 836 P.2d 1088, 1089 (Ct. App. 1992) (in
dicta - "The time for filing the appeal, however, was extended by the filing
of Freeman's motion to reconsider the dismissal which was timely filed within
fourteen days of the order to be reconsidered. I.R.C.P. ll(a) (2) (B); I.C.R.
57(b); I.A.R. 14. II).
The decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is squarely
within the court's discretion. Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 159 P.3d 937
( 2007) .

Abuse of discretion is determined by a three part test which asks

whether the district court
discretion;

(2)

acted

" ( 1)

wtihin

correctly perceived the issue as

the

to

it;

and

(3)

reached

of

outer boundaries of its discretion and

consistently with the legal standards applicable to
available

one

the

specific

choices

its decision by an exercise of reason."

Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 175 P.3d 754, 760 (2007)
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND OR RECONSIDER
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Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 765, 86 P.3d 475,
479 (2004))

(citing Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914

(2001)).
A rehearing or reconsideration in the trial court usually involves new
or additional facts, and a more comprehensive presentation of both law and
fact. Couer d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat. Bank of North Idaho, 118 Idaho
8l2t 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). Indeed, chief virtue of reconsideration

is to obtain a full and complete presentation of all available facts, so that
the truth may be ascertained, and justice is done. Id.
A motion for reconsideration need not present new evidence but may be
based upon an argument that the legal conclusion reached were incorrect or
that the Court did not consider relevant facts.

Id. See also Johnson v.

Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472, 147 P.3d 100, 104 (Ct.App. 2006).
GROUNDS TO ALTER OR AMEND OR RECONSIDER ORDER

A.

Introduction

After careful

review of

this Court's Order dismissing Mr. Grant's

petition for post-conviction relief. This Court, within its May 11, 2011,
Order set forth a list of reasons as to why it was dismissing Mr. Grant's
petition by stating he "failed to provide enough material facts in order to
substantiate all of the ten claims he set forth within the petition".
This court further stated an "Analysis" and "Notice of Deficiencies"
with a "Discussion" specifically pointing Mr. Grant failed to provide the
Court with any new information after giving its Notice of Intent to Dismiss on
March 17, 2011, pursuant to § 19-4906(b). Petitioner on May 5,

2011,

had

submitted a Motion for Leave to Amend Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND OR RECONSIDER
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order to properly cure any and all defects in the current petition and attempt
to overcome this Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss with a First Amended
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and First Affidavit of Facts in Support of
First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. This Court denied

this

Motion on May 13, 2011, two days after this Court's Order of Summary Dismissal
of the Petition for Post-conviction Relief.
B.

SUIIIllary

Dismissal Standard

A Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is separate and distinct from
underlying criminal actions which led to the petitioner's conviction. Peltier
v.

State,

119 Idaho 454,

456,

808 P.2d 373,

375 (1991).

It

is a civil

proceeding governed by the Uniform Post-conviction Procedure Act (hereinafter,
UPCA) (Idaho Code

§§ 19-4901 - 4911) and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

Peltier, 119 Idaho at 456, 808 P.2d at 375. Because it is a civil proceeding,
the petitioner must prove his allegations by a perponderance of the evidence.
Matinez v. State,

126 Idaho 813,

816,

892 P.2d 488,

491

(Ct.App. 1995).

However, the petitioner initiating post-conviction proceeding differs from the
complaint initiating a civil action. A post-conviction petition is required to
include more than "a short plain statement of the claim"; it "must be verified
with respect to the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and
affidavits, records or evidence supporting it allegations must be attached, or
the application must state why such supporting evidence is not attached." Id.
19-4903. "In other words, the application must present or be accompanied by
admissible evidence supporting the allegations, or the application will be
subject to dismissal." Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327,

331,

971 P. 2d 1151

( Ct.App. 1998).
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND OR RECONSIDER
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If

the petitioner presents some shred of evidentiary support of his

allegations, the district court must take the petitioner's allegations as true
at least until such time as they are controverted by the state. Tramel v.
State, 92 Idaho 643, 646, 448 P.2d 649, 652 (1986). this is so even i f the
allegations appear incredible on their fact. Id. Thus only after the State
controverts the petitioner's allegations can the district court consider the
evidence. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 651 P.2d 546 (Ct.App. 1982). But in
doing so, it must still liberally construe the facts and draw reasonable
inferences in favor of the petitioner. Small, 132 Idaho 917, 971 P.2d at 1155.
If a question of material fact is presented, the district court must
conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve that question. Small, 132 Idaho at
331, 971 P. 2d at 1155. If there is no question of fact, and the state is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, dismissal can be ordered sua sponte,
or pursuant to the State's Motion.
C.

I.e.

§ 19-4906(b), (c).

DISCUSSION

Mr. Grant had raised several ineffective assistance of counsel claims
within his petition for post-conviction relief. As such, Mr. Grant hereby sets
forth his claims in a more clearer fashion in order for this Court to properly
reconsider its May 11, 2011, order and i f so issue an order altering and
amending said order, along with new additional facts.
Claim One: Trial Counsel Ineffectiveness. Trial Counsel, Douglas Dykman, was
ineffective in representing Mr.

Grant. As a result,

Mr. Grant's right to

effective assistance of counsel under the "right to counsel" clause of the
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States was violated, and via
the Fourteenth Amendment "due process of law" clause, in violation of the
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND OR RECONSIDER
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"right to counsel" clause of Art. I, Sec. 13 of the Constitution of the State
of Idaho. See: Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984); among others.
This claim is based specifically on Mr. Grant's trial counsel's failure to
represent him as follows:
a)

Trial Counsel failed to disqualify Judge;

b)

Trial Counsel failed to file motion for change of venue;

c)

Mr. Grant was denied Conflict-Free Counsel;

d)

Trial Counsel coerced Mr. Grant to plead guilty;

e)

Trial Counsel failed to have the Doctor who performed the Mental
Health Evaluation at the sentencing hearing to offer mitigating
evidence;at the sentencing hearing;

f)

Trial Counsel failed to bring forth at sentencing a witness to offer
mitigating testimony. at the sentencing hearing.

In regards to the Six ( 6) claims above, Mr. Grant already presented in
the original petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Grant hereby sets forth
new and additional facts in a more comprehensive presentation of both law and
fact in order for this Court to reconsider its May 11, 2011, for the legal
conclusions reached were incorrect based upon relevant facts.
DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS
1.

Mr. Grant •s Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to disqualify
the Judge and 100tion for change in venue.

i.

facts pertaining to claims

While Mr. Grant was being held in the Bannock County Jail ( "BCJ") he was
appointed an attorney, Douglas Dykman, to represent him.
Upon Dykman being appointed to represent Mr. Grant, counsel came to the
BCJ and visited him in November 2009. Mr. Grant communicated to Counsel at
that time he wished to have Judge Naftz disqualified and a motion for change
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND OR RECONSIDER
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of venue be filed.
Mr. Grant explained to counsel the reason that he wished to have Judge
Naftz disqualifed was due to the fact that he had once represented his
brother, Chet Grant, in a felony case and Mr. Grant did not want Judge Naftz
opinon of his brother when he represented him to have any inferences that may
be negative towards him as such. This request to disqualify the Judge was
without cause as well.
Mr. Grant further requested that a motion for change in venue be filed
due to the domestic abuse charge involved the daughter of the secretary of the
Pocatello

Police

Chief.

Mr.

Grant

felt

that

with the victims mother's

employment would have undue influence with the Court due to her direct
involvement with law enforcement and the court's.
Mr.

Dykman refused to do either of these requests by stating to Mr.

Grant, "I'm not going to do this and it won't get us anywhere." and refused to
file the motion to disqualify the Judge. Counsel further stated in respects to
the motion for change in venue by stating, "I will not put in a motion for
change of venue because it won't help at all." or words to that effect.
ii.

why relief should be granted

Mr. Grant would contend that despite the district court's reasoning in
the May 11, 2011, Order, regarding the disqualification of Judge. At the time
of Mr. Grant's request the rule to disqualify without cause was in effect. It
is not for trial counsel to question as to why Mr. Grant wanted to disqualify
the Judge. Mr. Grant should have been entitled to the disqualification motion
to be filed by counsel. It is not a strategic nor a tactile decision for
Counsel to make.

He should have just done as requested for Mr. Grant was

MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND OR RECONSIDER
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entitled under due process of law to disqualify one Judge without cause as the
Rule allows under Idaho criminal Rules.
As to change of venue, Mr. Grant contends that it was proper for counsel
to

file

this motion at

the

least,

and demonstrate for

the

record

the

relationship of the victim and the victim's mother and place of employment in
order to demonstrate undue prejudice in taking the matter to tiral in Bannock
County opposed to another count. If at the least, the motion is filed and if
denied then Mr. Grant has the due process right to appeal that decision after
being convicted and sentenced if he so chooses to in a Direct Appeal.
Secondly, Mr. Grant at the time of these two requests was invoking his
right to a Jury Trial. As such, it would have been proper for counsel to at
least

file both motion and support them with the grounds that Mr. Grant had

provided in order to preserve the matter for appeal. As to the motion for
disqualification, Counsel should have filed it immediately without cause and
it would have been granted and the case would have been reassigned by the
Administrative Judge of the Sixth District.
2.

Mr. Grant was denied his Sixth Amendment Right to conflict-free
Counsel during the Trial Court proceedings.

i.

facts pertaining to claim

Mr. Grant while being housed in the BCJ was visited by counsel several
times during the pre-trial stages of his case. Counsel durring these visits
had continually attempted to get Mr. Grant to accept a non-binding plea bargin
offer to

the new charges of domestic

battery and

the possession

of

a

controlled substance charges. These offers only consisted of non-binding plea
agreements in which Mr. Grant was opposed to the offers and would refuse them
each and every time for he wanted a binding Rule 11 plea agreement. This was
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND OR RECONSIDER
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due to the fact Mr. Grant was affraid if he did not get a binding Rule ll plea
agreement the sentencing court would make his new charges consecutive to the
felony charges he was on probation for at the time of his arrest on these two
new charges. Counsel kept telling Mr. Grant i f he did not accept the plea
offer he would get 15 years if he went to trial and it could be consecutive to
the charge he was currently on probation for.
In April or May 2010, at a pre-trial conference before the district
court, Mr. Grant verbally motioned the court for new counsel to represent him
for there was a breakdown in communication. Counsel, Douglas Dykman, also
verbally motioned the court to be removed and new counsel be appointed to
represent Mr. Grant due to the breakdown in communication.
The district court denied both Mr. Grant and Douglas Dykman's request
regarding the appointment of new counsel for Mr. Grant by stating that it was
in the court's opinion that Mr. Grant had one of the better attorney's to
represent him on the matters before the court and ordered Mr. Dykman to
continue to represent Mr. Grant despite the fact that there was a known
breakdown in communication.
ii.

why relief should be granted

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, Sec.
13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantees the the right to counsel. The right to
counsel does not necessarily mean a right to the attorney of one's choice.
State v. Clark, 115 Idaho 1056, 1058, 772 P.2d 263, 265 (Ct.App.l989). Mere
lack of confidence in otherwise competent counsel is not necessarily grounds
for substitute counsel in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. State v.
McCabe, 101 Idaho 727, 729, 620 P.2d 300, 302 (1980); State v. Peck, 130 Idaho
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71L 713, 946 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Ct.App.l997). However, for "good cause" a trial
court may, in its discretion, appoint a substitute attorney for an indigent
defendant.

I.e.

§ 19-856; State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 897, 606 P.2d 10001

1001 (1980); Peck, 130 Idaho at 713, 946 P.2d at 1353. The trial court must
afford the defendant a full and fair opportunity to present the facts and
reasons in support of a motion for substitution of counsel after having been
made aware of the problems involved. Clayton, 100 Idaho at 898, 606 P.2d at
1002.
Here the district court did conduct some form of a review of this
matter, but in Mr. Grant's opinion the district court deprived Mr. Grant of a
full and fair opportunity to explain his problems and the court's review of
Grant's request for new counsel did not encompass the totality of his claims.
Mr. Grant had expressed that the purpose for substitution of counsel was
due to the fact that he and counsel had a breakdown in communication. More
specifically, Counsel continually attempted to get Grant to take a plea offer
and he would continually refuse for it was not a binding Rule 11 agreement.
Counsel was persistant with his efforts regarding this and as a result a
breakdown

in

communication

occurred.

Counsel

even

after

Mr.

Grant

had

attempted to have new counsel appointed for he wished to fire Mr. Dykman had
attempted on his own accord to remove himself as counsel of record for Mr.
Grant.
The Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 593, 181
P. 3d 512, 522 ( 2008) held in remanding his case back to the district court
that

"[T] he

court

must

make some reasonable,

non-suggestive efforts

to

determine the nature of the defendant's complaints and to apprise itself of
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND OR RECONSIDER
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the facts necessary to determine whether the defendant's relationship with his
or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to the point that sound discretion
requires substitution or even to such an extent

that

his or her Sixth

Amendment right would be violated but for substitution. 145 Idaho at 593, 181
P.3d at 522. Good cause includes an actual conflict of interest: a complete,
irrevocable breakdown of communication; or an irreconcilable conflict which
leads to an apparently unjust verdict. Id. See Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d
1314, 1320, (8th Cir .1991) (citing cases) ; McKee v. Harris 649 F. 2d 927, 931
( 2d Cir .1981).
In United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1250 (lOth Cir.2002)(decision
sets forth factors to be used in examining constitutional implication of a
total breakdown in communication: (1) whether the defendant's motion for new
counsel was timely;

( 2) whether the trial court adequately inquired into

defendant's reasons for making the motion; (3) whether the defendant-attorney
conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of communication precluding
an

adequate

defense;

and

(4)

whether

the

defendant

substantially

and

unreasonably contributed to the communication breakdown): State v. Torres, 208
Ariz. 340, 93 P.3d 1056, 1060-61 (2004); State v. Carman, 114 Idaho 791, 793,
760 P.2d 1207, 1209 (Ct.App.l988). If good cause is shown, the defendant is
constitutionally entitled to the appointment of new counsel. Vessey, 967 P.2d
at 964.
Here, Mr. Grant did not manufacture the conflict of interest. Counsel
created it when Mr. Grant informed him that he wished to take the matter to
trial unless he would receive a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, thus creating
a irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict as will
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND OR RECONSIDER
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be demonstrated in the next claim being presented.
Based upon the forgoing, Mr. Grant was deprived of conflict free counsel
by the district court, and was forced to have an attorney who had already
established on the record a conflict in representing Mr. Grant. As a result,
the district court denied Mr. Grant's Sixth Amendment Right to conflict free
counsel.
3.

Trial Counsel coerced Mr. Grant into pleading guilty.
i.

Mr.

facts pertaining to claim

Grant

hereby incorporates the facts pertaining to the previous

claim, and why relief should be granted in respects to said claim regarding
conflict free counsel as if restated in its entirety.
After the pre-trial hearing that took place in which Mr. Grant had
attempted to remove Mr. Dykman as counsel, and the court denying Mr. Dykman's
motion as well. Mr. Dykman had met with Mr. Grant's parents, Eric and Eunice
Grant, outside the Courtroom and spoke with them. What Mr. Dykman stated to
them at this meeting was repeated to Mr. Grant at a visit he had with his
mother, Eunice Grant, at the BCJ.
Eunice Grant informed Mr. Grant that Mr. Dykman had told them that "You
need to tell your son that he needs to take the deal or he is probably going
to get 15 years fixed. If he does take it the most he will do is 4 years fixed
on both new charges ran concurrent with the previous charge" that Mr. Grant
was currently on probation for.
As a result of this conversation with Mr. Dykman, both of Mr. Grant's
parents came to the BCJ the same day he spoke with them to visit Mr. Grant and
informed him of the conversation that took place that day after court. Both of
12
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Mr. Grant's parents told him to take the deal that Mr. Dykman had offered to
him for fear of loosing him to prison for 15 years. Mr. Grant informed both
parents "NO" regarding taking the plea offer that was conveyed to him by
counsel for he knew it was a trick to get him to plead guilty to the domestic
battery for it carried 10 years maximum and he wasn't going to take it unless
he received a binding Rule 11 Agreement in where the court and the prosecution
were bound to see that he only get 4 years concurrent with all other charges.
Several days transpired after Mr. Grant's meeting with his parents and
his mother still being upset over the matter began to have bi-polar episodes
over the events that took place and caused Mr. Grant to become manically
depressed as well.
Upon subpoena Mr. Grant's parent 1 s both can offer testimony to these
events as well if the Court so chooses to grant a hearing on these matters.
Mr.

Dykman appeared at the BCJ after Mr. Grant's last appearance in

court and his last visit with his parents when they conveyed Mr. Dykman 1 s
message to them to relay to Mr. Grant. Again, counsel presented to Mr. Grant
the same deal, plead guilty to possession and domestic battery and the state
would drop possession of a firearm, aggravated assault and the state would
also recommend to run all charges concurrent with Mr. Grant's 2005 aggravated
batter charge. Counsel also promised Mr. Grant that Judge Naftz assured him
that he had no problem with running all charges concurrent,
counsel

assured Mr.

Grant

and further

that would get no more than 4 years on the

possession and domestic charges.
Despite the fact that the plea offer was non-binding counsel had assured
Mr. Grant that this was what he would get for a sentence and was the only
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND OR RECONSIDER
Case No. CV-2011-759-PC

13

77

reason

he opted to

take

the

non-binding

plea agreement was based upon

counsel's promises and assurances. As a result, Counsel then began to assist
Mr. Grant in filing out the the Guilty Plea Questionnaire From. Idaho Criminal
Rules Appendix A, April 22, 2010, by telling Mr. Grant specifically what box's
to check on the form and what to write on the lines if it required further
information.
ii. why relief should be granted

A plea of guilty which is the result of coercion is invalid. Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 u.s. 239, 89 s.ct. 1709 (1969). However, coercion is not limited
to threats of physical violence. Many acts far short of physical violence have
been

asserted

constituting

coercion.

Some

of

these

claims

have

been

successful. As set forth below on the issue of coercion, the Idaho Courts are
in open disagreement with the Federal Courts on what constitutes coercions.
However, on the basic issue1 there is no disagreement.
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643, 647, 488 P.2d
649, 652 ( 1968) Justice Spear stated: "Additionally, i f at such a hearing the
appellant can prove by a perponderance of the evidence that he was, in fact,
coerced to change his plea of "not guilty" to one of "guilty" ••• he is entitled
to relief from that conviction. Goff v. State, 91 Idaho 361 415 P.2d 679
(1966)."
Here 1 Mr. Grant has first established that counsel was a conflict and
was created by the district court when it refused to appoint Mr. Grant new
counsel.

This

in turn with counsel's actions after both 1 Mr. Grant and

counsel, being denied appointment and removal from the case brings Mr. Grant's
allegations regarding coercion

in his favor.
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favorable plea negotiations on Mr. Grant's behalf, which was motivated by a
conflict of interest, established ineffective assistance of counsel. See Edens
v. Hannigan, 87 F.3d 1109 (lOth Cir.l996).
Several Circuit Court's have addressed ineffective of assistance of
counsel regarding coerced guilty plea's. U.S. V. Giardino 797 F. 2d 30 ( ls t
Cir.l986) (trial counsel lied to defendant to induce a guilty plea constitutes
ineffective assistance and requires the plea to be set aside); Moore v.

u.s.,

950 F.2d 656 (lOth Cir.l991) (Coerciion by trial counsel or the prosecutor to
induce guilty plea renders the plea involuntary) • It is clear based on the
facts presented herein and previous pleadings on file have substantiated this
fact. Furthermore, Key v. United States, 806 F.2d 133, 139 (7th Cir.l986)
(defendant must allege terms of promise by counsel; when, where, and by whom
such promisis were made and the precise identity of any witnesses tot he
promise). Mr. Grant has substantiated this very clearly as well.
Due to counsel having told Mr. Grant i f he did not take the deal he
would get 15 years fixed has rendered his plea involuntary. This was addressed
in Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510 (1962) (A plea of
guilty, i f induced by "promises" or threats, which deprive it of the character
of a voluntary act "is void and open to collateral attack").
As a result of this Mr. Grant's plea being coerced it is clear that an
evidentiary hearing must be held. See Dugan v. United States, 521 F. 2d 23L
233 (5th Cir.l975) (allegations accompanied by credible affidavits that raise
a substantial inference that an unkept bargain was made warrant an evidentiary
hearing;

courts

affidavit");

u.s.

should

be

"liberal

in

requiring

a

particular

form

of

v. Espinoza, 866 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir.l988) (Trial Counsel's
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promise that defendant would receive a specific sentence to induce guilty plea
required an evidentiary hearing to resolve the claim i f ineffectiveness of
counsel).
Based upon the foregoing this court should vacate its May 11, 2011,
order summarily dismissing Mr. Grant's petition fro post-conviction relief.
4.

Trial Counsel failed to have the Doctor who perfomred the Mental
Health Evaluation at the sentencing hearing to offer mitigating
evidence at the sentencing hearing.
i.

facts pertaining to claim

At the completion of the district court conducting the guilty plea
hearing, the district court ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI)
along with a mental health evaluation be done prior to sentencing in order to
assist the court in sentencing Mr. Grant.
Mr. Grant met with the Doctor who performed the Mental Health Evaluation
three (3)

times.

The first was to perform several series of tests.

Upon

completion of the first set of tests the Doctor came back two (2) more times
and performed additional interviews with Mr. Grant along with other testing.
At Mr. Grant's third interview and testing session with the Doctor he
had inquired from Mr. Grant who his attorney was. Mr. Grant provided Mr.
Dykman's name to the Doctor and he instructed Mr. Grant to have his counsel
contact him regarding his testing and evaluation in order to inform Counsel
that Mr. Grant was an excellent canidate for Mental Health Court.
The Doctor informed Mr. Grant that he based his recommendation for
Mental Health Court upon several factors but the one he had informed Mr. Grant
of was the fact that he had not been taking his medication for his bi-polar
condition.
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As

result Mr. Grant contacted his mother via phone from the BCJ and

asked her to contact Mr. Dykman and come to see him at the

BCJ

so he could

discuss the mental health evaluation issues that the Doctor had discussed with
him.
Mr. Dykman came to the BCJ a few days latter and saw Mr. Grant. Mr.
Grant then informed counsel then that the Doctor had stated that he was a good
canidate for mental health court and had asked him to contact the Doctor to
confer with him on this very important matter. Counsel told Mr. Grant at the
meeting "That's good news but the prosecution would have to go for it and they
never would." or words to that effect.
Mr. Grant then requested Counsel to have the Doctor at the sentencing
hearing to offer further testimony in regards to his evaluation and his
recommendation so that it was fully explained to the court and if any question
as to the evaluation was to come up by the prosecution, the court or Mr.
Grant's counsel it would be able to be answered without just guessing what the
Doctor intended his meaning to be.
ii. why relief should be granted
Mr. Grant has clearly set forth more facts for this court to reconsider
its previous decision regarding this matter. As such, it is clear that despite
what the district court stated in regards to this matter the district court
only looked to the Guilty Plea Questionnaire form when the plea was taken and
not the sentencing hearing.
Despite this fact. Mr. Grant has offered new and additional facts in a
more comprehensive presentation of facts shows that the court's May 11, 2011
decision regarding this matter was incorrect.
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It

is clear that there is issues presented herein that require an

evidentiary hearing for there are facts in dispute regarding this matter due
to Mr. Grant's communication with counsel prior to the sentencing hearing. As
such, this court should vacate its May ll,

2011, order and hold further

proceedings in line with this Motion.
Trial Counsel's failure to introduce evidence in the accused's favor
during sentencing hearing constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.See
Williams v. Taylor, 529

u.s. 362 (2001); Austin v. Bell, 125 F.3d 843 (6th

Cir.l997).
5.

Trial Counsel failed to bring forth at sentencing a witness to
offer mitigating testimony at the sentencing hearing.

i.

facts pertaining to claim

Upon Mr.

Dykman being appointed to represent Mr. Grant, counsel had

obtained an Investigator by Motion and Order of the Court. Ths was due to the
fact that counsel could not find any Police Report from any witnesses, and
Ashley gulgeman was the only witness to what had occurred.
The Investigator that Counsel obtained had conducted an investigation
into the charges that Mr. Grant was facing. As a result the Investigator had
located a key witness,

Ashley Gulgelman, who was the only witness to the

domestic batter charge.
It was discovered by the investigator had discovered that 90% of the
vitcims statement to the police was fabricated and embelished, and that Det.
Oak had actually conducted an interview with Gulgleman and intentionally lost
and/or misplaced the Police Report which was exculpatory evidence. Mr. Dykman
did not press this issue at all.
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Counsel

told

Mr.

Grant

that based upon the Investigator's findings

regarding the actual events that took place in regards to the domestic battery
charge he was going to have Ashly Gulgleman at his sentencing hearing in order
to offer mitigating evidence to the case. Counsel further stated that this
would benefit him, as well as aid in possibly being placed in mental health
court and probation. Counsel failed to have her present at the sentencing
hearing and as a result caused me prejudice.
ii. why relief should be granted

The substantive federal

law is well-established. Under Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), Mr. Grant must demonstrate both that his
counsel's representation was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an objective
standard

of

resonableness,"

u.s

Strickland, 466

and

that

the

deficiency

was

prejudicial.

at 687-88, 692. To show prejudice, Mr. Grant must only

demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional

errors,

the

result

of

the

proceeding

would

undermine the

confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694.
Once

Mr.

Grant

has

alleged

facts

which

if

true would

constitute

deficient performance the legal presumption dissolves. Therefore,

Mr. Grant

pleads a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel because it
is well-established law that inadequate preparation by defense counsel may
violate the Sixth Amendment. State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 10, 539 P.2d 556,
562 (1975); see also, Pompilla v. Beard,
Taylor,

529

u.s.

362,

396

investigation); see also,

(2000)

545 U.S.

374 (2005); Williams v.

(unreasonable failure to conduct through

ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

The Defense

Function, § 4-4.1 (3d ed. 1993) (emphasis added).
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The failure of Counsel to have Ashly Gulgleman at the sentencing hearing
to offer mitigating facts before the trial court sentenced him. This failure,
in turn, prejudiced Mr. Grant.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in this Motion to Alter or Amend with new and
additional facts as well as argument it is requested that this Court:
l.

VACATE

its

May

ll,

2011,

Order

Dismissing

Petition

for

Post-Conviction Relief;
2.

APPOINT counsel to represent petitioner based upon the additional

facts and evidence presented herein;
3.

FIND that the cumulative impact of counsel's deficiencies prejudiced

petitioner. In addition to finding prejudice form individual deficiencies are
cumulatively prejudicial;
4.

FIND that petitioner's sentence was not voluntary and coerced and as

a result grant the relief of a new sentence on the Domestic Battery Charge of
seven years, with two years fixed followed by two years indeterminate, and on
the possession charge a sentence of seven years with two years fixed, followed
by five years indeterminate to run concurrent with CR-2005-10583-FE; suspend
said sentence and place Mr. Grant in Mental Health Court;
5.

GRANT any further relief as this court may deem just and proper as

allowed by law.
Respectfully submitted this MAY

- ,.J{

~'

2011.

Woodrow Grant, Petitioner
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO
ss.
County of ADA
WOODROW GRANr, being sworn under oath deposes and says, that he is the
Petitioner in the in the above-entitled motion and has read the foregoing,
and that all statements are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and
belief, and is an Affidavit in and of itself.

Woodrow Grant

2<1

SUBSCRIBED,

I

2011.

AtitJ.v(64~

~tary

Public for Idaho

Commission expires:

v ~'fjz.c({,
I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on MAY~, 2011, I deposited an original of the
forgoing in the Prison Legal Mail System to be filed with the Court and true
and correct copies to be served as well via u.s. Mail postage prepaid to:
Mark L. Hiedernan
Bannock County Prosecuting Attorney
624 E. Center, Rm. 220
Pocatello, ID 83201

Woodrow Grant, Petitioner
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r:: o"VIN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
WOODROW GRANT,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

... I,r\

Case No. CV-2011-759-PC

ORDER DISMISSING
PETITION FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case comes before this Court on a Petition for Post Conviction Relief filed by
Woodrow Grant ("the Petitioner" or "Mr. Grant"). On March 17, 2011 , pursuant to Idaho Code
("IC") §19-4906 this Court issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss ("Notice") Mr. Grant's petition,
indicating its intent to dismiss each of the claims raised and providing Mr. Grant the 20 days
required by statute to submit a reply appropriately addressing his arguments and providing
satisfactory evidence that he is entitled to post conviction relief.
On April4, 2011, the Petitioner submitted a Motion to Amend Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief, wherein the Petitioner requested this Court "review the underlying criminal records
including, but not limited to the county jail's records during defendant's stay there, the psychevaluation, and the past and current medical records including mental health files." (Mot. to Amend
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, April4, 2011, 1.) Along with that motion, Mr. Grant also
submitted the Petitioner's Response to Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss, which did not include
any additional documents or affidavits. Nor did his response include information not previously
Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief
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considered and addressed by this Court in its Notice of Intent to Dismiss. The State filed nothing in
response. Further background on this matter was set out in detail in the Notice and is incorporated
herein by reference. 1
This Court is fully briefed in the Petitioner's allegations and the law. Furthermore, this
Court has carefully reviewed the Petitioner's Motion to Amend Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief, as well as the Petitioner's Response to Court's Notice oflntent to Dismiss. Based upon
the following discussion, this Court hereby DIMISSES the Petition for Post Conviction Relief.
ISSUES

1.

Whether to grant the Motion for Appointment of Counsel.

2.

Whether to grant the Petition for Post Conviction Relief.
DISCUSSION

In his Response to Court's Notice oflntent to Dismiss, Mr. Grant again requested the
appointment of counsel, stating: "Grant is currently incarcerated and cannot gather the records
and evidence which he wanted to be put on record." (Petitioner's Response to Court's Notice of
Intent to Dismiss ("Petitioner's Response"), April4, 2011, 1.) Mr. Grant further argued "he
doesn't have the ability or legal knowledge to represent himself personally to the standards this
Court is accustomed to." (!d.) The Petitioner additionally re-alleged the claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel previously addressed by this Court in the Notice of Intent to Dismiss.

1

The Notice also contains a thorough analysis ofthe Post-Conviction Relief statute and is not repeated in detail
here.
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1.

Motion for Appointment of Counsel
a.

Standard of Review

A request for appointment of counsel in a post conviction proceeding is governed by
Idaho Code ("IC") § 19-49042, which provides that a court-appointed attorney may be made
available to an applicant who is unable to pay the costs of representation. Charboneau v. State,
140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). The decision to grant or deny a request for
court-appointed counsel lies within the discretion of the district court. Id. (citing Fox v. State,
129 Idaho 881, 934 P.2d 947 (Idaho Ct.App. 1997)). When a district court is presented with a
request for appointed counsel, the court will address that request before ruling on the substantive
issues in the case. Id.
Under IC § 19-4904, the court "should determine if the petitioner is able to afford counsel
and whether this is a situation in which counsel should be appointed to assist the petitioner." Id.
at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. In making this analysis, the court considers the typical problems with
pro se pleadings, such as the fact that these types of pleadings are often conclusory and
incomplete and that facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged because the pro se
petitioner does not know what they may be. !d. (citing Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 23 P.3d
138 (2001)). The court must examine the record to determine "whether the facts are such that
they justify the appointment of counsel." !d. at 794, 102 P .3d at 1113. In doing so, every
2

§ 19-4904. Inability to pay costs.
If the applicant is unable to pay court costs and expenses of representation, including stenographic, printing, witness
fees and expenses, and legal services, these costs and expenses, and a court-appointed attorney may be made
available to the applicant in the preparation of the application, in the trial court, and on appeal, and paid, on order of
the district court, by the county in which the application is filed.
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inference must run in the petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented and cannot be
expected to know how to allege the necessary facts. /d. At a minimum, the court "must
carefully consider the request for counsel, before reaching a decision on the substantive merits of
the petition." /d.
If, after examining a petitioner's claims, the court determines that such claims are
frivolous, "it is essential that the petitioner be given adequate notice of the claimed defects so he
has an opportunity to respond." /d. at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. If the petitioner alleges facts that
raise the possibility of a valid claim, the court should appoint counsel in order to give the
petitioner an opportunity, working with counsel, to properly allege the necessary supporting
facts. /d.; see also, Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491,493,95 P.3d 642,644 (Idaho Ct.App.
2004) (Although the petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to search the
record for possible nonfrivolous claims, he should be provided with a meaningful opportunity to
supplement the record and to renew his request for court-appointed counsel prior to the dismissal
ofhis petition where he has alleged facts supporting some elements of a valid claim.). The court
"should provide sufficient information regarding the basis for its ruling to enable the petitioner to
supplement the request with the necessary additional facts, if they exist." /d.
"[A] district court presented with a request for appointed counsel in a post-conviction
action must address that request before ruling on the substantive issues in the case and errs if it
denies a petition on the merits before ruling on the applicant's request for counsel." Judd v.
State, 148 Idaho 22,218 P.3d 1, 2 (Idaho Ct.App. 2009).
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However,
an order that simultaneously dismisses a post-conviction action and denies a motion for
appointment of counsel will be upheld on appeal if the petitioner received notice of the
fatal deficiencies of the petition and if, when the standard governing a motion for
appointment of counsel is correctly applied, the request for counsel would properly be
denied - that is, when the petitioner did not allege facts raising even the possibility of a
valid claim.

!d. at 4. A determination regarding a request for the appointment of counsel and a determination
regarding whether a petition for post conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal are thus
governed by "quite different standards, with the threshold showing that is necessary in order to
gain appointment of counsel being considerably lower than that which is necessary to avoid
summary dismissal of a petition." !d.

b.

Analysis

This Court must examine the petition to determine whether the facts alleged justify the
appointment of counsel. If such facts appear to this Court to be frivolous, or the situation
presented does not appear to be one in which counsel should be appointed to assist the Petitioner,
this Court may deny the request for counsel.
Based on the following findings, this Court hereby DENIES the Petitioner's Motion for
Appointment of Counsel, as the allegations made by the Petitioner are frivolous for the reasons
stated herein. Furthermore, this Court finds the Petitioner did not allege facts raising even the
possibility of a valid claim. Therefore, the appointment of counsel is not required.

5
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2.

Notice of Deficiencies
a.

Standard of Review

In Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007), the Idaho Supreme
Court set forth this thorough and clear statement of the legal standard that applies to a petition
for post conviction relief:
An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post Conviction
Procedure Act (UPCPA) is civil in nature. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36 P.3d
1278, 1282 (2001). Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant for post-conviction
relief must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the
application for post-conviction relief is based. Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 995 P.2d 794
(2000). Unlike the complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, an application for postconviction relief must contain more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that
would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Rather, an application for postconviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of
the applicant. I.C. § 19-4903. The application must include affidavits, records, or other
evidence supporting its allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not
included. ld
Summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate if the
applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact. I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c). On
review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary
hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will
liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
Gilpin-Grubb v. State. 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002), citing LaBelle v. State,
130 Idaho 115, 118, 937 P.2d 427, 430 (Ct.App.l997). A court is required to accept the
petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions.
Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001). When the alleged facts,
even if true, would not entitle the applicant to relief, the trial court may dismiss the
application without holding an evidentiary hearing. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869,
801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990), citing Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187,
1190 (1975). Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of
relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record ofthe original proceedings, or (2)
do not justify relief as a matter of law. ld
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"On appeal from a summary disposition, [the Court of Appeals] exercises free review.
Yon v. State, 124 Idaho 821,822,864 P.2d 659,660 (Ct.App.1993); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho

145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct.App.l988)." Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381, 382, 924 P.2d
1225, 1228 (Idaho Ct.App. 1996).
DISCUSSION

As explained, Mr. Grant's Response to the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss concerns
the alleged failure of his counsel to adequately represent him. The Petitioner did not raise any
arguments not already addressed by this Court; nor did the Petitioner provide this Court with any
new information. The Petitioner set forth ten grounds in support of his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. This Court will address each in tum.

a.

Standard of Review Governing a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

"In order to establish a violation of the constitutional guarantee to effective assistance of
counsel, the defendant must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice." Beasley
v. State, 126 Idaho 356,359,883 P.2d 714,717 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994) (internal citations

omitted). The test for evaluating whether a criminal defendant has received the effective
assistance of counsel is two-pronged and requires that the petitioner establish: (1) counsel's
conduct was deficient because it fell outside the wide range of professional norms; and (2) the
petitioner was prejudiced as a result of the deficient conduct. Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 584,
6 P.3d 831, 834 (2000); Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 101,982 P.2d 931,936 (1999) (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052,2064 (1984)). "Facts presented

must be in the form of competent, admissible evidence. Bare assertions and speculation,
7
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unsupported by specific facts, do not suffice to show ineffectiveness of counsel." Roman v.

State, 125 Idaho 644,649, 873 P.2d 898, 903 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994)(internal citations omitted).
In assessing the reasonableness of attorney performance, counsel is presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment. Pratt, 134 Idaho at 584, 6 P.3d at 834; State v. Matthews, 133 Idaho 300,
306-07, 986 P.2d 323, 329-30 (1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Strategic and tactical
decisions will not be second guessed or serve as a basis for post conviction relief under a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective review.

Pratt, 134 Idaho at 584, 6 P.3d at 834; Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368
(1994), cert denied 513 U.S. 1130 (1995). To satisfY the prejudice prong of the Strickland test,
the applicant must establish that there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's
unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Milburn v.

State, 135 Idaho 701, 706, 23 P.3d 775, 780 (Idaho Ct.App. 2000)(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694); Fox v. State, 125 Idaho 672, 674, 873 P.2d 926, 928 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994). The applicant
must show that the attorney's deficient conduct 'so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.' Milburn,
135 Idaho at 706, 23 P.3d at 780 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). The applicant must show
actual unreasonable performance by trial counsel and actual prejudice. /d. "Hence, dismissal is
proper if the applicant fails to meet his burden under either part." Fox, 125 Idaho at 674, 873
P.2d at 928; Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903 ("To avoid summary dismissal, a postOrder Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief
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conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must sufficiently allege facts under both
prongs of the test.").
b.

Analysis
1.

Change of venue/Change of judges

The Petitioner again argued his counsel was ineffective by "failing to request a change of
venue or the recusal" of the judge. (Petitioner's Response at 2.) As this Court explained in its
Notice of Intent to Dismiss, counsel's failure to secure a change of venue or to request a new
judge are not appropriate issues for review in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. "The
reasons for a change of venue, as set forth in Idaho Criminal Rule 2l(a) and 2l(b)3, are that a fair
and impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the case is pending or that the convenience
of the parties and the witnesses would best be served by a change of the venue." State v. Fee,
124 Idaho 170, 175, 857 P.2d 649, 654 (Idaho Ct.App. 1993). "[T]he issue of whether a change
of venue should be requested is a matter of trial strategy and tactical choice, not subject to review
as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the absence of proof of inadequate preparation
or ignorance on counsel's part. State v. Carter, 103 Idaho 917, 923, 655 P.2d 434, 440 (1982)."

!d. Likewise, "the decision whether to request the recusal of a trial judge is a strategic matter,
one which should be left to the discretion ofthe attorney. See Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924,

3

Rule 21. Change of venue
(a) For Prejudice. The court upon motion of either party shall transfer the proceeding to another county if the court
is satisfied that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the case is pending.
(b) Other Cases. For the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice, the court upon motion
of the defendant may transfer the proceedings as to the defendant to another county.

9
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877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994)." Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 333, 971 P.2d 1151, 1157 (Idaho
Ct.App. 1999).
In this case, there is nothing in the record to establish the basis for a change of venue or
the recusal of the trial judge, even if such requests had been made. Furthermore, the Petitioner
offered nothing more than his own conclusory and bare allegations, unsupported by the record or
affidavits. The petition submitted by Mr. Grant does not provide any basis for an objective
evaluation regarding his counsel's decisions in relation to a change of venue or a change of
judge. The Petitioner did not adequately support his argument that a fair and impartial trial could
not be had in Bannock County, or offer any argument that the convenience of the parties and the
witnesses would best be served by a change of the venue. Similarly, Mr. Grant did not
adequately support his claims regarding the supposed bias of the judge. As such, the failure of
the Petitioner's counsel to move for a change of venue and/or the recusal of the judge did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel since those decisions was clearly a matter of trial
strategy and tactical choice. In addition, the Petitioner did not present evidence adequate to
satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, as Mr. Grant did not "draw a causal connection
between the alleged deficiencies of his attorney's performance and his decision to plead guilty."

Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 677, 227 P.3d 925,931 (2010). Nowhere in his Response, did
the Petitioner allege that had his counsel submitted a request for a change of venue and/or the
recusal of the judge, that he would have pleaded not guilty. !d. As such, this Court finds these
claims to be without merit.
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2.

Counsel did not pursue the option of Mental Health Court

Mr. Grant next restates his argument that his counsel was ineffective in not pursuing the
option of participation in the Mental Health Court. (Petitioner's Resp. at 3.) In particular, the
Petitioner asserts he "request[ed] his public defender attempt to have this case be referred to the
mental health court but as far as Grant can tell, no attempt was made." (/d.) However, beyond
offering conclusory allegations regarding this contention, the Petitioner again failed to offer any
admissible evidence in support of his argument that his counsel was ineffective in failing to have
his case transferred to the Mental Health Court. Furthermore, "(w]here the alleged deficiency is
counsel's failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been
granted by the trial court, is generally determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test. Id at
158-59, 857 P.2d at 637-38." Fairchild v. State, 128 Idaho 311, 318, 912 P.2d 679, 686 (Idaho
Ct.App. 1996). Mr. Grant did make application to Drug Court, which application was denied.
The Petitioner has submitted nothing to indicate his application for Mental Health Court would
have been accepted. Furthermore, Mr. Grant has failed to illustrate through his Response
sufficient facts to indicate that his counsel was deficient in this regard and he was thereby
prejudiced. Additionally, Mr. Grant does not indicate his decision to plead guilty would have
been different if his counsel had pursued the option of an alternative court. Furthermore, this
Court was well aware of Mr. Grant's mental health history upon sentencing, and the outcome of
his case would not have been affected had the Petitioner's attorney made application to the
Mental Health Court. As such, this claim cannot result in the requested relief.
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3.

Counsel was ineffective for failing to protect the Petitioner's interests
during the psychological evaluation

Mr. Grant next reasserts his claim that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to
advise him of his rights in relation to a psychological evaluation.
It is well-settled that a psychiatric evaluation, performed after the determination of guilt

and for the express purpose of sentencing, is not a critical stage for Sixth Amendment purposes.

Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448,462,224 P.3d 515, 529 (Idaho Ct.App. 2009). However, while
"the majority of courts have held that a pretrial psychiatric examination is not a critical stage", a
defendant is entitled to counsel regarding the decision to undergo the examination itself. !d.
Thus, "a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel regarding only the decision of
whether to submit to a [psychiatric] exam." !d. at 455, 224 P.3d at 522. ("The Estrada and

Estelle Courts took pains to distinguish the right to the advice of counsel regarding the
examination process from a right to the presence of counsel during the examination process.") In
discussing the duties of counsel in regard to a psychiatric evaluation, the Idaho Court of Appeals
has further explained: "The advice of counsel during the decisional phase provides the defendant
with information as to the examination process as well as the right to refuse examination to avoid
self-incrimination. Thus armed, the defendant can adequately proceed through the examination."

/d. at 456, 224 P.3d at 523.
In this case, Mr. Grant specifically alleged his counsel did not inform him of his right to
remain silent in regard to the psychological evaluation. Mr. Grant stated: "P.D. Dykeman
should have informed Grant that the mental health examiner was not bound by patient/doctor
12
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privilege and anything said by Grant could and, most likely, would be used against him by the
state." (Petitioner's Response at 4.) Mr. Grant further asserted: "The P.D. never informed
Grant that he was not even required to participate in the psych-eval. That Grant was not required
to provide information against himself even if there was a court order in effect." (Jd.) However,
Mr. Grant has presented no admissible evidence to demonstrate his counsel failed to advise him
properly regarding his rights prior to his participation in the psychological examination. Instead,
the Petitioner has only set forth unsubstantiated and unverified claims, which can provide no
relief under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Furthermore, in his Guilty Plea
Questionnaire, Mr. Grant clearly indicated he understood his rights, including his right to remain
silent even after pleading guilty. Specifically, the Petitioner indicated he understood he had the
right to "refuse to answer or provide any information that might tend to increase the punishment
for the crime(s) to which" he was pleading guilty. (Guilty Plea Questionnaire Form, Idaho
Criminal Rules Appendix A, April22, 2010, 2.) Mr. Grant further indicated he had "sufficient
time to discuss" his case with his attorney. (!d. at 5.) Furthermore, to the extent the Petitioner
claims his rights pursuant to Estrada v. State were violated, Mr. Grant indicated his attorney had
advised him that he had "a constitutional right not to submit to a court ordered psychosexual
evaluation for purposes of sentencing". (Id. at 6.) As such, his claim regarding ineffective
assistance of counsel in this regard cannot stand.

4.

Failure of counsel to submit mitigating evidence

Mr. Grant also reasserted the claim that his counsel failed to present mitigating evidence.
(Petitioner's Response at 4.) The Petitioner set forth specific examples of such evidence and also
Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief
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argued he was not given an opportunity to "state his side to rebut the prosecution's blown-out-ofproportion description of the facts surrounding the incident Grant was involved in." (!d. at 5.)
However, there was nothing submitted to this Court that identified any mitigating
evidence that might have changed the outcome of these proceedings. See State v. Wood, 132
Idaho 88, 97, 967 P.2d 702, 711 (1998) (Because the petitioner failed to submit anything to the
court that "identifie[d] any mitigating evidence that might have changed the outcome of these
proceedings", the petitioner failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel.). Furthermore, as
indicated by his Guilty Plea Questionnaire, the Petitioner had no issues with his attorney and his
handling of this case. For example, Mr. Grant answered, "no" to the question of whether there
was anything he had requested his attorney to do that had not been done. (Guilty Plea
Questionnaire Form at 5.) The Petitioner further stated he had reviewed the evidence in the case
with his attorney. (!d.) By pleading guilty, Mr. Grant further willingly and knowingly waived
his right to confront the witnesses against him, as well as the right to present witnesses and
evidence in his defense. (!d. at 2.) Moreover, the Petitioner was provided an opportunity to
make a statement and comments to this Court during sentencing. As such, the Petitioner has
failed to substantiate this claim with the required evidence.

5.

Counsel did not explain the Petitioner's appeal rights

Mr. Grant's again argues his counsel was inadequate by failing to explain his appeal
rights. (Petitioner's Response at 5.) This Court previously addressed this claim in its Notice of
Intent to Dismiss finding Mr. Grant failed to adequately support this allegation. In his Response,
Mr. Grant has not offered this Court any additional or even pertinent information regarding this
14
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claim. Mr. Grant recites his opinions regarding the legal duties of public defenders, but offers
nothing admissible in support of his allegation that his counsel actually failed to advise him of
his rights. The Petitioner did not submit any affidavits or supplementary documents or point to the
record in support of this claim. Furthermore, in his Guilty Plea Questionnaire, Mr. Grant indicated
he was not waiving his right to appeal the judgment of conviction and sentence. (Guilty Plea
Questionnaire Form at 4.)
Thus, Mr. Grant has once again only offered bare, conclusory and unverified allegations
unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence. Thus, he has not proven his allegations by a
preponderance of the evidence as required by the statutes governing post conviction proceedings,
and this claim cannot merit the requested relief. See Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 862, 243
P.3d 675, 678 (Idaho Ct.App. 2010).

6.

Counsel failed to protect the Petitioner's interests during the PreSentence Investigation

Mr. Grant also reasserts his previous argument that his counsel failed to protect his rights
during the pre-sentence investigation ("PSI"). (Petitioner's Response at 6.) The Petitioner
further claims his "mental health issues" prevented him :from objecting to the PSI at the time of
sentencing. (/d.)
As explained in the Notice of Intent to Dismiss, the Idaho Court of Appeals has
determined that counsel cannot provide ineffective assistance by failing to advise a client
concerning his presentence investigation since a presentence interview is "not a critical stage of
the adversarial proceedings .... " Stuart v. State, 145 Idaho 467,471, 180 P.3d 506,510 (Idaho
15
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Ct.App. 2008). "' [I]f the stage is not critical, there can be no constitutional violation, no matter
how deficient counsel's performance.' United States v. Ben/ian, 63 F .3d 824, 827 (9th Cir.l995);

see Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562, 149 P.3d at 837." Hughes, 148 Idaho at 452,224 P.3d at 519.
Furthermore, as explained in this Court's Notice, the defendant bears the burden of objecting to a
PSI at the time of sentencing. Cunningham v. State, 117 Idaho 428, 788 P.2d 243 (Idaho Ct.App.
1990). Although the Petitioner now claims his "mental health issues" prevented him from objecting
to the PSI, he does not support that allegation; rather, Mr. Grant merely sets forth unverified and
conclusory allegations. This Court cannot grant a Petition for Post Conviction Relief on such bare
claims. Therefore, Mr. Grant has not proven this allegation by a preponderance of the evidence
as required by the statutes governing post conviction proceedings.

7.

Counsel should have recognized and accounted for the Petitioner's
mental health issues

Mr. Grant previously argued his counsel was ineffective in failing to recognize the
Petitioner's mental health issues and addictive behaviors. In his Response, the Petitioner raises
those same arguments and additionally explicitly states that he was incompetent when entering
his plea. This Court already addressed these allegations in its Notice of Intent to Dismiss,
including Mr. Grant's claim ofincompetence.
"The standard to determine competency to stand trial is whether the defendant has 'the
capacity to understand the proceedings against him and (2) assist in his defense."' Ridgley v.

State, 148 Idaho 671, 678, 227 P.3d 925, 932(2010)(quoting Dusky v. US., 362 U.S. 402, 80
S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)).
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In order to find that petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective for refusing to request a ...
hearing on petitioner's competency to stand trial, petitioner must show that counsel was
deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the outcome of petitioner's proceedings. In
[Jeter, 41 7 S.E.2d at 596], this Court proclaimed that in proving Strickland prejudice
within the context of counsel's failure to fully investigate the petitioner's mental
capacity, "the [petitioner] need only show a 'reasonable probability' that he was ...
incompetent at the time of the plea."
!d. Thus, in a post conviction relief action, the petitioner has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was incompetent when he entered his guilty plea.
/d.(intemal citations omitted).
By his Response, Mr. Grant has once again not provided admissible evidence showing
that there is a reasonable probability that he was incompetent at the time he entered his plea. Mr.
Grant offered nothing more than his own conclusory statements, as well as his own personal
opinions. In fact, Mr. Grant admitted that he could only offer this Court "hearsay as he is not a
mental health specialist." (Petitioner's Resp. at 7.) The Petitioner's own conclusory and bare
\

assertions alone are not sufficient to survive summary dismissal. Mr. Grant's Response offers
nothing more than a mere conclusion that he was not competent to understand the nature of the
proceedings and knowingly enter into a guilty plea, and is also unsupported by any facts as to his
alleged mental incompetency. Furthermore, in his Guilty Plea Questionnaire, Mr. Grant
unequivocally indicated he was able ''to make a reasoned and informed decision" in his case.
(Guilty Plea Questionnaire Form at 3.) He further stated he had not taken any medications or
drugs, or consumed any alcoholic beverages that would affect his ability to make a reasoned and
informed decision. (!d.) In addition, this Court was well aware of the Petitioner's mental health
history, including his current diagnoses and the fact that he was taking prescription medications
17
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for his mental health issues. Without something in the record suggesting that Mr. Grant was
incompetent or that an examination would have shown that Mr. Grant was incompetent, there is
nothing to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland, and this claim must also fail.

8.

Counsel made false assurances regarding the plea agreement and
possible sentence

The Petitioner next re-argues the claim that he was given false assurances regarding his
sentence. (See Petitioner's Response at 7.)
This Court previously addressed this claim in its Notice of Intent to Dismiss, finding Mr.
Grant failed to adequately support this allegation. In his Response, Mr. Grant has not offered
this Court any additional admissible information. The Petitioner did not submit any affidavits or
supplementary documents or point to the record in support of this claim. Mr. Grant asserted: "As
the State had requested the charges run concurrent and Grant's P.D. had said that the Judge assured
him the sentences would run concurrent, Grant feels he was tricked into signing the plea agreement
by his attorney." (Petitioner's Response at 8.) However, the Petitioner indicated he understood his
plea agreement was "non-binding" and that the court "may impose any sentence authorized by law .
. . ." (Guilty Plea Questionnaire Form at 4.) Mr. Grant specifically acknowledged:
I understand that my plea agreement is a non-binding plea agreement. This means that the
court is not bound by the agreement or any sentencing recommendations, and may impose
any sentence authorized by law, including the maximum sentence stated above. Because the
court is not bound by the agreement, if the district court chooses not to follow the
agreement, I will not have the right to withdraw my guilty plea.
(/d.) The Petitioner further indicated he understood that by pleading guilty to more than one crime,
the "sentences for each crime could be ordered to be served either concurrently (at the same time) or
18
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consecutively (one after the other)". (!d.) Moreover, the Petitioner has not satisfied the prejudice
prong of Strickland by his arguments. The Idaho Court of Appeals has given the following
pertinent explanation regarding counsel's role in the plea process:
Where, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea
upon the advice of counsel, "the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's
advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."
Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 373, 825 P.2d 94, 96 (Ct.App.l992). See also Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); State v. Soto, 121
Idaho 53, 55, 822 P.2d 572, 574 (Ct.App.1991). When it is asserted that a guilty plea was
the product of ineffective assistance, to prove the prejudice prong the defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he or she would
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59,
106 S.Ct. 366; Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 59, 106 P.3d 376, 385 (2004).

Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 884, 187 P.3d 1253, 1259 (Idaho Ct.App. 2008.) Mr. Grant did
not "draw a causal connection between the alleged deficiencies of his attorney's performance
and his decision to plead guilty." Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 677, 227 P.3d at 931.
Therefore, based on the answers Mr. Grant provided in the Guilty Plea Questionnaire, as
well as his failure to put forth admissible evidence, this Court finds the Petitioner's pleas were
entered voluntarily and with full awareness of the possible consequences that might follow. Mr.
Grant has not provided this Court with any indication that the entry of his guilty pleas was the
result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, as Mr. Grant has only offered bare, conclusory
and unverified allegations unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence, he has not proven his
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence as required by the statutes governing post
conviction proceedings, and this claim cannot merit the requested relief.
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9.

The Petitioner's efforts to fire his court-appointed attorney failed

Mr. Grant next reasserted his allegation that post conviction relief is warranted because
he asked this Court to assign him a new public defender, which request was denied. (See
Petitioner's Response at 8.)
As already stated by this Court in its Notice, the Petitioner makes no claim by this
allegation that his counsel was deficient or that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiency. In
his Response, Mr. Grant offered no further documentation or admissible evidence regarding this
allegation. Therefore, as already determined by this Court, this contention is not even oriented
toward a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and is therefore not sufficient to support a
petition for post conviction relief.

10.

Counsel failed to call certain witnesses

Lastly, the Petitioner once again argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to call
certain witnesses, including the victim in this matter and the private investigator hired by
counsel. (Petitioner's Response at 8.)
The Idaho Court of Appeals has set forth the following succinct explanation regarding the
decision to call witnesses:
It is well settled that the decision whether to call a particular witness is a strategic or
tactical decision which will not be second-guessed or serve as a basis for post-conviction
relief under an alleged claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless that decision is
shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 775
P.2d 1243 (Ct.App.l989); see also State v. McKenney, 101 Idaho 149, 609 P.2d 1140
(1980), citing State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 556 (1975).
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Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254,258, 869 P.2d 571, 575 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994).
The petition submitted by Mr. Grant does not provide any basis for an objective
evaluation regarding his counsel's decision whether to call witnesses. Once again, the Petitioner
has submitted conclusory statements and presented no admissible evidence to give rise to a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether his counsel's performance fell outside the wide range
of professional norms. Furthermore, as explained, the decision whether to call a particular
witness is clearly a strategic or tactical one. Therefore, his claim of ineffective assistance in this
regard also fails.

c.

The Petitioner did not adequately support his claims of ineffective assistance

Notwithstanding the preceding discussion, Mr. Grant still failed to show how his
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. First, Mr. Grant failed to demonstrate that his counsel's performance fell
outside the wide range of professional norms, as he offered nothing more than conclusory
statements. Mr. Grant did not support his allegations of ineffective assistance with proper
documentation or argument. Secondly, even accepting the Petitioner's claim that his counsel
was inadequate, the Petitioner still failed to demonstrate prejudice, as he offered no compelling
argument that the outcome ofhis case would have been different but for his attorney's
unprofessional errors. Therefore, Mr. Grant's allegation that his counsel was ineffective is no
more than a conclusory allegation. "Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific
facts, do not suffice to show ineffectiveness of counsel." Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at
21
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903. As such, the Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are without merit, and
his Petition for Post Conviction Relief cannot be granted on such basis.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, as well as the reasoning set forth in the Notice of Intent to
Dismiss, this Court hereby DISMISSES the Petition for Post Conviction Relief.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this lQ_ day ofMay, 2011.

~C.~
ROBERT C. NAFTZ
DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:
Mark L. Hiedeman
Woodrow Grant, IDOC No. 80692
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CL""---IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
WOODROW GRANT,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2011-759-PC
ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
AMEND PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

This case comes before this Court pursuant to a "Motion for Leave to Amend Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief' filed by Woodrow Grant ("the Petitioner" or "Mr. Grant").
On March 17, 2011, pursuant to Idaho Code ("IC") § 19-4906 this Court issued a Notice of
Intent to Dismiss ("Notice") Mr. Grant's Petition for Post Conviction Relief, indicating its intent to
dismiss each of the claims raised in the Petition and providing Mr. Grant the 20 days required by
statute to submit a suitable reply. On April4, 2011, the Petitioner submitted a Motion to Amend
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, along with the Petitioner's Response to Court's Notice of Intent
to Dismiss. Thereafter, this Court issued an Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relie£
On May 5, 2011, the Petitioner submitted the subject motion seeking to amend his petition in order
to cure any and all defects in the current petition and attempt to overcome this Court's
Notice of Intent to Dismiss with a First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and
First Affidavit of Facts in Support of First Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
along with other pleadings to further the petitioner in defeating this Court's Notice of Intent
to Dismiss.
(Mot. for Leave to Amend Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, May 5, 2011, 2.)
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DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b) 1, a court may dismiss an application for post
conviction relief sua sponte. However, "[w]hen a court dismisses an application sua sponte, the
statute requires the court give the applicant 20-days' notice prior to the proposed dismissal."

Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007). Thereafter, "[i]n light of the
reply, or on default thereof, the court may ... grant leave to file an amended application or, direct
that the proceedings otherwise continue." IDAHO CoDE ANN.§ 19-4906(b) (2010)(emphasis
added). Thus, the decision whether to grant leave to amend an application for post conviction
relief is a discretionary one. As such, this Court is not required to consider the issues presented
by an amended petition, even if such amendment is filed prior to the district judge's dismissal.

See Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 111, 15 P.3d 820, 824(2000).
This Court properly notified the Petitioner of its intention to dismiss his pro se
application for Post Conviction Relief for failing to set forth sufficient facts upon which relief
could be granted. Pursuant to IC § 19-4906(b), Mr. Grant had 20 days to reply to the proposed
dismissal. Mr. Grant submitted a timely response, which included a motion to amend. By his
reply, Mr. Grant did include new arguments not previously raised in his original Petition for Post
Conviction Relief, which this Court reviewed and addressed. Mr. Grant has now submitted a
I

Idaho Code§ 19-4906 states, in part:'

(b) When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, and the record, that the applicant
is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings, it may indicate
to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing. The applicant shall be given an
opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal. In light of the reply, or on default thereof, the court
may order the application dismissed or grant leave to file an amended application or, direct that the proceedings
otherwise continue. Disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if there exists a material issue of fact.
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second request to amend his petition. This request was received before this Court issued its
Order dismissing the Petition for Post Conviction Relief, but well after the 20 days provided to
Mr. Grant to submit a suitable reply. As this Court has now issued its Order Dismissing Petition
for Post Conviction Relief, which addressed arguments not previously raised, this Court, in its
discretion, sees no need for further amendment. Mr. Grant's second request to amend his
petition, filed well after the expiration of his 20 days to respond, is no longer relevant. As such,
this Court hereby DENIES the Motion for Leave to Amend Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
This Court's recent dismissal of the Petition for Post Conviction Relief stands.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this~ day ofMay, 2011.

~c.~

ROBERT C. NAFTZ
DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:
Mark L. Hiedeman
Woodrow Grant, IDOC No. 80692
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
WOODROW GRANT,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2011-759-PC

ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO ALTER OR
AMEND OR RECONSIDER
PETITION FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case comes before this Court on a "Motion to Alter or Amend or Reconsider Order
Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief' filed by Woodrow Grant ("the Petitioner" or
"Mr. Grant"). Mr. Grant is appealing this Court's dismissal of his Petition for Post Conviction
Relief, which was issued on or about May 11, 2011. Pursuant to that dismissal, this Court denied
the Petition for Post Conviction Relief on the grounds that Mr. Grant "did not raise any
arguments not already addressed by this Court; nor did the Petitioner provide this Court with any
new information." (Order Dismissing Pet. for Post Conviction Relief, May 11, 2011, 8.) Mr.
Grant had made allegations regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, which, after thorough
review, this Court found to be frivolous. In addition to finding each of Mr. Grant's ten
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel to be without merit, this Court determined the
Petition for Post Conviction Relief must also be denied because Mr. Grant's allegations were
conclusory, in violation of the standards governing post conviction proceedings. (See id. at 21.)

Order Denying Motion to Alter or Amend or Reconsider
Case No. CV-2011-759-PC

By his current motion, Mr. Grant is moving this Court to "Alter or Amend or
Reconsider" the Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief. He is bringing that
motion pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e), 60(b), and ll(a)(2)(B). (See Mot. to
Alter or Amend or Reconsider Order Dismissing Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief, May 27, 2011,
("Mot. to Alter or Amend or Reconsider") 1.) According to Mr. Grant, he has submitted this
motion to set "forth his claims [regarding ineffective assistance of counsel] in a more clearer
fashion in order for this Court to properly reconsider its May 11, 2011, order and if so issue an
order altering and amending said order, along with new additional facts." (!d. at 5.)
After being fully briefed in the Petitioner's allegations and the law, and, after careful
review of the Petitioner's Motion to Alter or Amend or Reconsider Order Dismissing Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief, this Court hereby issues the following Order DENYING the Petitioner's
motion.

1.

Whether to grant the Petitioner's Motion to Alter or Amend or Reconsider.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

"It is well established that an action under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is

civil in nature and that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure [IRCP] are applicable in such a
proceeding. State v. Goodrich, 104 Idaho 469, 660 P.2d 934 (1983). See also, Idaho Criminal
Rule 57(b)." Ross v. State, 141 Idaho 670,671, 115 P.3d 761 (Idaho Ct.App. 2005). "A motion
to reconsider a dismissal order properly should be treated as a motion to alter or amend a
judgment under I.R.C.P. 59(e) if the motion was timely filed. Hamilton v. Rybar. Ill Idaho 396,
Order Denying Motion to Alter or Amend or Reconsider
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724 P.2d 132 (1986)." !d. To be timely under that rule, a motion "must be filed within fourteen
days after the entry of the 'judgment."' !d. However, if a motion
for "reconsideration" raises new issues, or presents new information, not addressed to the
court prior to the decision which resulted in the judgment, the proper analogy is to a
motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). That rule requires a showing of good
cause and specifies particular grounds upon which relief may be afforded. Hendrickson v.
Sun Valley Corporation, Inc., 98 Idaho 133, 559 P.2d 749 (1977). As with Rule 59(e)
proceedings, the right to grant, or deny, relief under the provisions of Rule 60(b) is a
discretionary one with the trial court. Johnston v. Pascoe, 100 Idaho 414, 599 P.2d 985
(1979).
Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 263, 646 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Idaho Ct.App. 1982.) In this case, Mr.

Grant's motion would be considered timely under IRCP 59(e). Furthermore, as will be explained
in greater detail below, Mr. Grant did not raise any new issues or present any new information
not previously addressed by this Court prior to the decision which resulted in the judgment.
Therefore, even though the Petitioner based his motion on several rules ofldaho civil procedure,
including 59(e), 60(b), and ll(a)(2)(B), it is most proper for this Court to consider Mr. Grant's
motion under Rule 59(e) 1•
"Rule 59 is a mechanism 'designed to allow the trial court either on its own initiative or
on motion by the parties to correct errors both of fact and law that had occurred in its
proceedings."' State v. Goodrich, 104 Idaho 469, 471, 660 P.2d 934, 936 (1983)(internal
citation omitted). That rule ''thereby provides a mechanism for corrective action short of an

1

Rule 59. New trial

(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than
fourteen (14) days after entry of the judgment.
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appeal. Such proceedings must of necessity, therefore, be directed to the status ofthe case as it
existed when the court rendered the decision upon which the judgment is based." Lowe, 103
Idaho at 263, 646 P.2d at 1034 (internal citation omitted). With motions to alter or amend
judgment, a party is not permitted to present new evidence. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468,
472, 147 P.3d 100, 104 n.3 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006). "A Rule 59(e) motion to amend a judgment is
addressed to the discretion of the court. Cohen v. Curtis Publishing Co., 333 F.2d 974 (8th Cir.
1964)." /d. As such, "[a]n order denying a motion made under Rule 59(e) to alter or amend a
judgment is appealable, but only on the question of whether there has been a manifest abuse of
discretion." /d.(intemal citation omitted). Accordingly, this Court must recognize the matter as
discretionary, act within the outer boundaries of its discretion, and reach its conclusion through
an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power, Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803
P.2d 993, 1000(1990).
DISCUSSION

By his latest motion, the Petitioner has once again raised claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel. Mr. Grant asserts he is bringing this motion in order to set "forth new and additional
facts in a more comprehensive presentation of both law and fact in order for this Court to
reconsider its May 11, 2011, [order] for the legal conclusions reached were incorrect based upon
relevant facts." (Mot. to Alter or Amend or Reconsider at 6.) However, Mr. Grant merely
reasserts the same claims he has raised in his previous motions for post conviction relief. In
particular, Mr. Grant again argues his counsel was ineffective in the following ways:
a)

Trial Counsel failed to disqualify Judge;

Order Denying Motion to Alter or Amend or Reconsider
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b)
c)
d)
e)

f)

Trial Counsel failed to file motion for change of venue;
Mr. Grant was denied Conflict-Free Counsel;
Trial Counsel coerced Mr. Grant to plead guilty;
Trial Counsel failed to have the Doctor who performed the Mental Health
Evaluation at the sentencing hearing to offer mitigating evidence at the
sentencing hearing;
Trial Counsel failed to bring forth at sentencing a witness to offer
mitigating testimony at the sentencing hearing.

(!d. at 6.)
This Court has already addressed each of these claims in detail in both its Notice oflntent
to Dismiss and its Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief, finding such arguments
to be conclusory and therefore insufficient to merit relief pursuant to the standards governing
post conviction proceedings. By his Motion to Alter or Amend or Reconsider, Mr. Grant simply
re-asserts these same claims of ineffective assistance, without presenting any compelling
argument regarding alleged errors of fact or law committed by this Court in dismissing the
Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Therefore, as Mr. Grant has not raised any new issues or
presented any new information and has failed to sufficiently demonstrate that any error of fact or
law has occurred, this Court must deny the Petitioner's motion.
CONCLUSION

This Court hereby DENIES the Motion to Alter or Amend or Reconsider Order
Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Even considering the so-called clarified facts
and arguments included within the Petitioner's motion, Mr. Grant still did not make a sufficient
showing that any error, either factual or legal, occurred in this Court's previous decision
dismissing the Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Based on the record in this case in its
Order Denying Motion to Alter or Amend or Reconsider
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entirety, the weight of the evidence favors this Court's dismissal. Therefore, the Petitioner's
Motion to alter or amend the findings made by this Court under IRCP 59(e) cannot stand, and the
Petitioner's Motion is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

~

3_ day of JU(y, 2011.

~;;J~
DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:
Mark L. Hiedeman
Woodrow Grant, IDOC No. 80692
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Inmate name WtJtJdrow t:r#t.nl
IDOC No. f5b&q2 /set t.lh;l-(3
Address P.a ._ =f>:="X'-"'-"to..r._"Y:::-----l{cr ;~ __ ldah:.~- ~~ZQ2__
Defendant-Appellant
IN TilE DISTRicT couRT oF THE ::

1Xr#

JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF Tl IE STATE OF IDAI 10, IN AND FOR TilE COUNTY OF f}/fJVJI}cej<__

Peti toner- Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent
COMES NOW, i,v~oJ row

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

~-r·a.nf

Case No.

Cit -,;u:ni·/S'"CJ-fC..

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPORT FOR
APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL

, Petitioner-Appellant in the

above entitled matter and moves this Honorable Court to grant Defendant-Appellant's Motion
for Appointment of Counsel tor the reasons more fully set forth herein and in the Affidavit in
Support of Motion for Appointment of Counsel.
I.

Petitioner-Appellant is currently incarcerated within the Idaho Department of

Corrections under the direct care, custody and control of Warden :Ye}u~t/ln,a

2.

:5;~.,-E4

The issues to be presented in this case may become to complex for the Petitioner-

Appellant to properly pursue. Petitioner-Appellant lacks the knowledge and skill needed to
represent him/herself.

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL- I
l{cn>ed
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3.

Petitioner-Appellant required assistance completing these pleadings, as he/she
was unable to do it him/herself.

4.

Othcr:J/qwe--~h

DATED this

lf;p<Jtt?fft'Lbtf

t'£1/,Q.. 5iark /lfY'4Jkl~ l"vt61<'c P~~ck"'-

JL day of Se._? }e._,...\,< r

, 20 I I .

lt

Jdcl rl(Cl
Petitioner-Appellant

t-J

Cbro..r-.L

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

STATE OF IDAHO
) ss

County of LIJ'-'J=,="''----- )

LtJ,=t,""-,,<:1""'J"'-~'-"ftJ=V.=J__..C-"-'-'rn...,&CL'+f____ , after first being duly sworn upon his/her oath, deposes
and says as follows:
I.

I am the Affiant in the above-entitled case;

under the care, custody and control of Warden :FchtJ.q44

$,-,r·&

3.

I am indigent and do not have any funds to hire private counsel;

4.

I am without bank accounts, stocks, bonds, real estate or any other form of real

property;
5.

I am unable to provide any other form of security;

6.

I am untrained in the law;

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL- 2
ReVIsed
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7.

If I am forced to proceed without counsel being appointed I will be unfairly

handicapped in competing with trained and competent counsel of the State;
Further your affiant saycth naught.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner-Appellant respectfully prays that this Honorable

Court issue it's Order granting Petitioner-Appellant's Motion for Appointment of Counsel to
represent his/her interest, or in the alternative grant any such relief to which it may appear the
Petitioner-Appellant is entitled to.
()

~

\

DATED This _0_ day of __.>..£_A?"'-+f>-}_._~"""'""'-'-"-"\,""-"-<,_c_ _ _ • 20_}_L_.

Petitioner-Appellant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN AND AFFIRMED to before me this

of_~vb~ , 20 /I.

'J day

N~M/

Commission expires: ~~ZI/'-f
I
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

B

day of

).€' pl<! e"- b;: r , 20_l_t_,

mailed a copy of this MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL for the purposes of filing \vith the court and of mailing a true and correct copy via
prison mail system for processing to the U.S. mail system to:

Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Division

P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

/J.r1111~ c: k

County Prosecuting Attorney

w-

Ck) .J Cu'.J

Petitioner-Appel iant

~r O.J\\-:
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Full Name of Party Filing Document

~~(J. l3~x

1¥

Mailing Address (Street or Post Office Box)

s~ ;,~

1d!ut(J

"83 1o2

City, State and Zip Code

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE ~l.XT/1

JUDICIAL DISTRICT

FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF G/f/1//tl<'lck
Case No. CV-;;u,ti-7S'l-fC
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR
PERMISSION TO PROCEED ON PARTIAL
PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER)

vs.
Defendant.- f~f;f:<J/l~r-

IMPORTANT NOTICE: Idaho Code§ 31-3220A requires that you serve upon counsel for
the county sheriff, the department of correction or the private correctional facility,
whichever may apply, a copy of this motion and affidavit and any other documents filed
in connection with this request. You must file proof of such service with the court when
you file this document.

D Plaintiff

0i)etendant asks to start or defend this case on partial payment of court fees,

and swears under oath
1. This is an action for (type of case) llffe«t(

" P &.rf- C.'tf)nr/ le..f?oPz !2el.-1.e.f

.

I

believe I am entitled to get what I am asking for.
2. [tl111ave not previously brought this claim against the same party or a claim based on
the same operative facts in any state or federal court.

D I have filed this claim against the

same party or a claim based on the same operative facts in a state or federal court.
3. I am unable to pay all the court costs now.

I have attached to this affidavit a current

statement of my inmate account, certified by a custodian of inmate accounts, that reflects the
activity of the account over my period of incarceration or for the last twelve ( 12) months,
whichever is less.

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED
ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER)
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4. I understand I will be required to pay an initial partial filing fee in the amount of 20% of the
greater of: (a) the average monthly deposits to my inmate account or (b) the average monthly
balance in my inmate account for the last six (6) months. I also understand that I must pay the
remainder of the filing fee by making monthly payments of 20% of the preceding month's
income in my inmate account until the fee is paid in full.
5. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true. I understand that a false
statement in this affidavit is perjury and I could be sent to prison for an additional fourteen (14)
years.
(Do not leave any items blank. If any item does not apply, write "N/A". Attach additional pages if more space is
needed for any response.)

IDENTIFICATION AND RESIDENCE:
Name:

t,J&t§drat,.J kNttt·l:

Address:

f

dJ ~

Other name(s) I have used: _ _ _ _ _ _ __

lioX 12::_. Jk, f.Jc 1/2 [{] /e; 7
)

How long at that address? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Phone: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Year and place of birth: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

DEPENDENTS:
I am ~gle D married. If married, you must provide the following information:
Name of spouse: _____________________________________________________

My other dependents including minor children (use only initials and age to identify children) are: _ __

INCOME:
Amount of my income: $______ per D week D month

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED
ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER)
CAO FW 1-14 6/8/2011

PAGE2

Other than my inmate account I have outside money from: _ _
-"'&....;;"""'-----------

My spouse's income: $_---..:#"::o.<--- per D week D month.
ASSETS:
List all real property (land and buildings) owned or being purchased by you.

Your
Address

Legal

City

State

Description

Value

Equity

List all other property owned by you and state its value.

Description
Cash

(provide description for each item)

Value

lnm,-tf62 Hw·l /lcccHA,I

Notes and Receivables _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Vehicles _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Bank/Credit Union/Savings/Checking Accounts _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Stocks/Bonds/Investments/Certificates of Deposit._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Trust Funds____________________________________________
Retirement Accounts/IRAs/401 (k)s._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Cash Value Insurance_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Motorcycles/Boats/RVs/Snowmobiles_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Furniture/Appliances_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Jewelry/Antiques/Collectibles_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Description

(provide description for each item)

TVs/Stereos/Computers/Eiectronics_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Tools/Equipment_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Sporting Goods/Guns_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Horses/Livestock/Tack_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED
ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER)
CAO FW 1-14 6/8/2011
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Other

EXPENSES:

(List all of your monthly expenses.)

Average
Monthly Payment

Expense

Rent/House Payment._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

..&--

Vehicle Payment(s) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Credit Cards

Loans

(List last four digits of each account number.)

(name of lender and reason for loan)

Electricity/Natural Gas._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Water/Sewer/Trash_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Phone_·~~~-----------------------------------------

J&

Groceries Cemez~"ffdr//

(: Sooo

I

Clothing._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Auto Fuel.________________________________________
Auto Maintenance_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Cosmetics/Haircuts/Salons. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Entertainment/Books/Magazines.__________________
Home Insurance____________________________________
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ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER)
CAO FW 1-14 6/8/2011

129

PAGE4

Average
Monthly Payment

Expense

Auto Insurance._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

e::

Life Insurance._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

~
~so()

Medical Insurance_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Medical Expense ,pleJ./~cq (
Other h6'j5<l /

c:)~l') eJ <??-

cdl' -- CA.r/
7

./· S.oo

.ez_:;

/IZa :./'

MISCELLANEOUS:

How much can you borrow? $_ ___;"&;;.____ _ _ _ _ From w h o m ? - - - - - - - - - When did you file your last income tax return?

aoo8

Soo' CH..J

Amount of refund:$

PERSONAL REFERENCES: (These persons must be able to verify information provided.)

Name

Eu:Jn.., G r OV'\\

Phone

Address

Poc.p.,\ die;>

~~0

1: c!

Years Known

d.(J

.t...t t 3 t;

:u.

Typed/printed

STATE OF IDAHO
)
' J
) ss.
County of ,JL/l.l...t.a~,(::{~----->
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me on this

c:o·

dayof

;?q~~t Z&t(

~-

Notary Public fori Idaho
Residing at IC!lW
Commission expires

/

1

8/J( '?L!l t(

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED
ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER)
CAO FW 1-14 6/8/2011

130

PAGES

- IDOC TRUST

OFFENDER BANK

=======

BAL~~CES

Doc No: 80692
Name: GRANT, WOODROW JOHN
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE
Transaction Dates:

08/22/2011

ISCI/UNT13 PRES FACIL
TIER-D CELL-94

08/01/2010-08/22/2011

Beginning
Balance
0.00

Total
Total
Current
Charges
Payments
Balance
1608.96
1633.81
24.85
================================ TRANSACTIONS ===============================~
Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance
08/03/2010
08/03/2010
08/05/2010
08/09/2010
08/09/2010
08/16/2010
08/16/2010
08/16/2010
08/23/2010
J8/24/2010
08/25/2010
J8/30/2010
J8/30/2010
08/31/2010
09/03/2010
J9/23/2010
09/28/2010
09/30/2010
l0/01/2010
10/05/2010
10/06/2010
10/08/2010
10/12/2010
10/13/2010
10/19/2010
10/20/2010
10/29/2010
11/02/2010
_l/03/2010
_1/04/2010
11/09/2010
:1/15/2010
'1/16/2010
1/16/2010
~1/29/2010

11/30/2010
"2/07/2010
·2/10/2010
:2/14/2010

HQ0509116-001
HQ0509126-012
HQ0509592-010
110510207-936
110510207-937
110510956-754
110510956-755
110511009-014
110511745-724
HQ0511936-017
110512197 025
II0512627-710
II0512627-711
110512849-010
1C0513396-338
HQ0515727-018
IC0516314-557
HQ0516504-018
IC0516678-013
IC0516897-517
IC0517382-020
HQ0517870-008
IC0517927-561
IC0518343-029
IC0518919-688
HQ0519092-009
HQ0520042-014
IC0520360-526
IC0520671-012
HQ0520724-017
IC0521439-557
HQ0522095-016
IC0522179-646
IC0522304-006
HQ0523469 014
IC0523588-011
IC0524936-488
HQ0525483-003
IC0525877-493

950-REINCARCERATED
013-RCPT RDU
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
071-MED CO PAY
099-COMM SPL
011 RCPT MO/CC
100-CR 1NM CMM
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
071-MED CO-PAY
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
078-MET MAIL
099-COMM SPL
078-MET MAIL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
078-MET MAIL
099-COMM SPL
022-PHONE TIME
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
078-MET MAIL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099 COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
078-MET MAIL
011-RCPT MO/CC
070-PHOTO COPY
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL

IBSUSPCHK
RDU
RTCP MO

383325
RTCP MO

397008
289942
171930
114549
116152
056586
115978
116547
879315
117188
521575
076807
117143
731067
117142
741214

0.00
1.03
50.00
14.97DB
12.13DB
10.20DB
5.59DB
5.00DB
1.86DB
40.00
1.86
19.27DB
6.80DB
7.00DB
10.00DB
340.00
85.75DB
100.00
0.17DB
78.22DB
1.73DB
50.00
22.30DB
1.73DB
280.23DB
17.00DB
25.01
21.48DB
2.75DB
20.00
21.79DB
20.00
17.88DB
2.71DB
50.00
2.80DB
36.59DB
40.00
36.59DB

0.00
1.03
51.03
36.06
23.93
13.73
8.14
3.14
1.28
41.28
43.14
23.87
17.07
10.07
0.07
310.87
254.32
354.32
354.15
275.93
274.20
324.20
301.90
300.17
19.94
2.94
27.95
6.47
3.72
23.72
1.93
21.93
4.05
1. 34
51.34
48.54
11.95
51.95
15.36

=

IDOC TRUST

===========

OFFENDER BANK BALANCES

==========

Doc No: 80692
Name: GRANT, WOODROW JOHN
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE
Transaction Dates:

08/22/2011

=

ISCI/UNT13 PRES FACIL
TIER-D CELL-94

08/01/2010-08/22/2011

Beginning
Balance
0.00

Total
Total
Current
Charges
Payments
Balance
1608.96
1633.81
24.85
================================ TRANSACTIONS =================== ============
Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance
12/14/2010
12/14/2010
12/14/2010
12/17/2010
12/20/2010
12/21/2010
12/23/2010
12/28/2010
01/04/2011
01/07/2011
01/10/2011
Ol/11/2011
01/18/2011
01/18/2011
01/24/2011
0 1 / 2 5 / 2 0 11
01/27/2011
01/31/2011
02/01/2011
02/03/2011
02/08/2011
02/08/2011
02/11/2011
02/11/2011
02/14/2011
02/15/2011
02/15/2011
02/22/2011
02/22/2011
03/01/2011
03/02/2011
03/08/2011
03/09/2011
03/15/2011
J3/18/2011
03/21/2011
03/21/2011
03/22/2011
J3/29/2011

IC0525914-493
IC0525926-670
IC0525974-022
HQ0526491-008
IC0526734-012
HQ0526858-009
IC0527219-495
HQ0527590-011
IC0528324-630
IC0529034-029
HQ0529142-011
IC0529332-582
IC0529982-599
IC0529984-027
IC0530741-027
I C0 5 3 0 8 16 - 5 8 2
HQ0531291-016
IC0531529-029
IC0531587-567
HQ0532078-014
IC0532636-528
HQ0532829-012
IC0533232-022
IC0533236-007
HQ0533255-024
IC0533363-658
HQ0533511-001
IC0533968-513
HQ0534057-023
IC0534891-502
HQ0535040-019
IC0535797-507
HQ0536018-002
IC0536585-626
HQ0537060-024
IC0537237-019
IC0537238-016
IC0537335-568
HQ0538044-014

099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
078-MET MAIL
011-RCPT MO/CC
078-MET MAIL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
078-MET MAIL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
099 COMM SPL
100-CR INM CMM
078-MET MAIL
0 9 9 - COMriJ S PL
061-CK INMATE
078-MET MAIL
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
022-PHONE TIME
078-MET MAIL
070-PHOTO COPY
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
961-FIX BATCH 5332
099 COMM SPL
022-PHONE TIME
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
022-PHONE TIME
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
078-MET MAIL
078-MET MAIL
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC

122490
845087
121218
843423
182745
127823
640902

132982
K-133158
132091
317879
131224
132410
132413
632904
FIX BATCH
121184
732821
133985
249807
133872
135556
551287

-36.59DB
44.21DB
4.85DB
20.00
6.16DB
50.00
48.07DB
50.00
54.13DB
1.05DB
30.00
6.00DB
26.48DB
54.13
2.75DB
42.29DB
9.25DB
2.07DB
7.00DB
40.00
31.26DB
6.80DB
2.34DB
4.30DB
10.00
6.37DB
20.00
14.97DB
3.40DB
1. SODB
50.00
26.97DB
3.40DB
19.50DB
30.00
1.90DB
5.08DB
14.01DB
100.00

51.95
7.74
2.89
22.89
16.73
66.73
18.66
68.66
14.53
13.48
43.48
37.48
11.00
65.13
62.38
20.09
10.84
8.77
1.77
41.77
10.51
3.71
1. 37
2.93DB
7.07
0.70
20.70
5.73
2.33
0.83
50.83
23.86
20.46
0.96
30.96
29.06
23.98
9.97
109.97

= IDOC TRUST =========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES ========== 08/22/2011 =

Doc No: 80692
Name: GRANT, WOODROW JOHN
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE

ISCI/UNT13 PRES FACIL
TIER-D CELL-94

Transaction Dates: 08/01/2010-08/22/2011
Beginning
Balance
0.00

Total
Total
Current
Charges
Payments
Balance
1608.96
1633.81
24.85
================================ TRANSACTIONS ================================
Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance
03/31/2011
03/31/2011
03/31/2011
04/01/2011
04/04/2011
04/05/2011
04/05/2011
04/11/2011
04/11/2011
04/11/2011
04/13/2011
04/13/2011
04/14/2011
04/14/2011
04/18/2011
04/18/2011
04/20/2011
04/25/2011
05/02/2011
05/03/2011
05/09/2011
05/09/2011
05/11/2011
05/13/2011
05/16/2011
05/23/2011
05/25/2011
05/31/2011
05/31/2011
06/02/2011
06/03/2011
06/06/2011
06/09/2011
06/10/2011
06/13/2011
06/15/2011
06/16/2011
06/27/2011
06/30/2011

HQ0538385 006
HQ0538452-271
IC0538464-006
II0538723-001
II0538945-772
HQ0539138-012
II0539254-011
II0539825-005
II0539869-922
II0539869-923
II0540340-001
HQ0540350-001
HQ0540414-012
II0540474-018
II0540794-771
II0540794-772
II0541121-021
!!0541477 690
II0542157-658
II0542374-001
HQ0543305-001
II0543339-885
II0543756-012
HQ0543978-019
II0544142-685
II0544833-664
II0545099-001
II0545534-014
II0545649-017
HQ0546011-021
II0546150-018
II0546413-797
HQ0547041-008
II0547221-013
II0547382-819
HQ0547655-020
II0547779-005
II0548847-665
HQ0549364-008

061-CK INMATE
970 533048 VOIDED
045-ICE CREAM
072-METER MAIL
099-COMM SPL
013-RCPT RDU
100-CR INM CMM
072-METER MAIL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
071-MED CO-PAY
012-RCPT CHECK
011-RCPT MO/CC
071-MED CO-PAY
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
070-PHOTO COPY
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
072-METER MAIL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
070-PHOTO COPY
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
072-METER MAIL
072-METER MAIL
070-PHOTO COPY
011-RCPT MO/CC
223-MAY PAY PENDYN
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
072-METER MAIL
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
072-METER MAIL
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC

J-135650
6

J-135650
184389
POWER
171265
446247
ICE CREAM
RCPT MO
446233
184390
189707
RTCP MO
189706
RTCP MO
187116
174315
187117
RTCP MO
PENDYNE
RTCP MO
184049
RTCP MO
184051
RCPT MO

4.25DB
-4.25DB
4.25DB
2.27DB
13.10DB
0.53
13.10
2.75DB
19.12DB
31.39DB
3.00DB
4.25
20.00
11.00DB
17.00DB
26. 30DB
2.45DB
10.07DB
1.64DB
0.88DB
20.00
2.27DB
1.00DB
20.00
29.32DB
8.64DB
3.36DB
0.44DB
4.70DB
40.00
12.00
40.08DB
20.00
2.22DB
22.51DB
5.00
1.71DB
2.55DB
10.00

105.72
109.97
105.72
103.45
90.35
90.88
103.98
101.23
82.11
50.72
47.72
51.97
71.97
60.97
43.97
17.67
15.22
5.15
3.51
2.63
22.63
20.36
19.36
39.36
10.04
1.40
1.96DB
2.40DB
7.10DB
32.90
44.90
4.82
24.82
22.60
0.09
5.09
3.38
0.83
10.83

=

IDOC TRUST

===========

OFFENDER BANK BALANCES

==========

Doc No: 80692
Name: GRANT, WOODROW JOHN
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE

08/22/2011

=

ISCI/UNT13 PRES FACIL
TIER-D CELL-94

Transaction Dates: 08/01/2010-08/22/2011
Beginning
Balance
0.00

Total
Total
Current
Charges
Payments
Balance
1608.96
1633.81
24.85
================================ TRANSACTIONS ================================
Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance
06/30/2011
07/01/2011
07/05/2011
07/07/2011
07/12/2011
07/18/2011
07/18/2011
07/19/2011
07/21/2011
07/21/2011
07/25/2011
08/01/2011
08/03/2011
08/05/2011
08/05/2011
08/08/2011
08/08/2011
08/08/2011
08/10/2011
08/10/2011
08/15/2011
08/18/2011
08/22/2011

HQ0549364-009
II0549535-012
II0549742-773
HQ0550057-001
HQ0550774-002
II0551322-808
II0551322-809
HQ0551470-006
II0551816-014
II0551817-003
II0552021-701
HQ0552722-012
II0552971-005
II0553412-009
1!0553495-012
II0553691-879
II0553691-880
HQ0553711-019
II0554027-006
HQ0554071-015
II0554512-771
HQ0554991-004
II0555193 001

011-RCPT MO/CC
223-JUN PAY PENDYN
099-COMM SPL
960-FIX BATCH 5493
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
072-METER MAIL
072 METER MAIL
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
072-METER MAIL
072-METER MAIL
211-JUL PAY PENDYN
099-COMl\1 SPL
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
072-METER MAIL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
072-METER MAIL

134

RCPT MO
PENDYNE
FIX 549364
RTCP MO
RCPT MO
194382
194381
RCPT MO
194407
80692
PENDYNE
RCPT MO
194461
RCPT MO
RCPT MO
194462

100.00
30.00
40.40DB
100.00DB
25.00
13.25DB
10.82DB
20.00
1.71DB
1.71DB
17.33DB
15.00
3.41DB
1.71DB
31.90
3.71DB
31.96DB
30.00
1.71DB
5.00
33.45DB
20.00
1.71DB

110.83
140.83
100.43
0.43
25.43
12.18
1.36
21.36
19.65
17.94
0.61
15.61
12.20
10.49
42.39
38.68
6.72
36.72
35.01
40.01
6.56
26.56
24.85

IN THE DISTRicr COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRicr OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

WOODROW GRANT,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent-Respondent on Appeal,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No.
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
OF
APPEAL

________________________)

Appealed from: Sixth Judicial District, Bannock County
Honorable Judge Robert C. Naftz presiding
Bannock County Case No: CV-2011-759-PC
Order of Judgment Appealed from: Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction
Relief field the 11th day of May, 2011 and Order Denying Motion to Alter or
Amend or Reconsider Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
Attorney for Appellant: Woodrow Grant, pro se, Boise, Idaho
Attorney for Respondent: Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise
Appealed by: Woodrow Grant
Appealed against: State of Idaho
Notice of Appeal filed: September 21, 2011
Notice of Cross-Appeal filed: No
Appellate fee paid: No, exempt
Request for additional records filed: No

135

Request for additional reporter's transcript filed:
Name of Reporter: Stephanie Davis
Was District Court Reporter's transcript requested? Yes from the Underlying
Criminal Cases CR-2009-19451-FE and CR-2009-19445-FE.
Estimated Number of Pages: More than 100

Dated~-\ V\'\~ LL..., 2o \\
DALE HATCH,
Clerk of the Distr~i~loY.(._

I.

Inmat~o: name lvoocl cqf&J~t:i/1LJ()C

N().

~~91.. ~L_i,h_i.f_:iJ

Address L~--'l;:;l'-._1"(_~--------·
Pn: /:fl2;,- / tfg/u) f:5 :;.t?7C7

IN TilE DISTRICT COURT OF TilL-~ '51,15_:r_IL__~----· JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF TIIF STATE OF ID!\110. IN AND FOR TilE COUNTY OF B/INN~ e.J;:_

t, . .:·6{;}2t'!or:;. {;

R!l~L------~·

)
)

Petitioner-Appellant.

)
VS.

)

)

STATE OF IDAHO.

Case No. t!..l./ -,l." /1-?s·q -I'<:

)

)

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR
APPOINTMENT
OF COUNSEL

)

Respondent.

IT IS

)

IIEARBY ORDERED that the Petitioner-Appellant's Motion for

Appointment of Counsel is granted and

lh.e 614 f<-. ~1/;._fe_

f,

tJ.

(attorney's

name). a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is hereby appointed to represent
said defendant in all proceedings involving this appeal.
DATED

thi~~ day of ___2~t~" \, (;

ORDLR GR:\NTIN(I 1\IOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL
H\'\ l't'il 1!> i 7 I)~

.20_l_t.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNlY OF BANNOCK

WOODROW JOHN GRANT,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 39207-2011

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

I, DALE HATCH, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that the
above and foregoing record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound
under my direction as, and is a true, full, and correct record of the pleadings and
documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho appellate
Rules.
I do further certify that there were no exhibits marked for identification or
admitted into evidence during the course of this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal

(Seal)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

WOODROW JOHN GRANT,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court No. 39207-2011

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

I, DALE HATCH, the duly elected, qualified and acting Clerk of the District
Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Bannock, do hereby certify that there were no exhibits marked for identification
and introduced into evidence at trial. The following exhibit will be treated as a
exhibit in the above and foregoing cause, to wit:

1.

Presentence Report from CR-2009-19451-FE and CR-2009-19445-FE.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal

~~/,,,~'

~~ '>

DALE HATCH1

/~~annock M>4btv,
(Seal)
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\··-~-~~IL7;~"--,

of the District Court
State of Idaho

Depu ~~crefk,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

WOODROW JOHN GRANT,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 39207-2011
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, DALE HATCH, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that I
have personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the
CLERK'S RECORD to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
Lawrence G. Wasden
Idaho Attorney General
Post Office Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

Molly Huskey
Appellate Public Defender
Post Office Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0005

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal
of said Court at Pocatello, Idaho, this _ _

(Seal)

DALE HATCH,
Cletk~of;the District Court
r--~~B~(l~ pount):~ Idaho Supreme Court

~~_:~5r~"~,~~~;::::2\'~"'::::::::"~\::::::::::::::::=::::::::::~::::::::.::::::::__
Deput:y~oem-,~~---

